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All observed government policies must pass through a political process. In many
macroeconomic settings, the implemented policies affect the economy not only
during the current period, but also the future path of the economy. In this disser-
tation, I investigate policies pertaining to immigration, redistribution, and poverty
reduction.
In the first chapter, I study how politics jointly determine the economy’s redis-
tribution and immigration policies. I develop a dynamic political economy model
featuring three groups of voters: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and retirees.
The model also features both inter- and intra-generational redistribution, resem-
bling a welfare state. To analyze multi-group political economy equilibria, I extend
the class of dynamic political games featuring Subgame-perfect Markov as its equi-
librium concept. The analysis allows for strategic voting behavior, where voters
may vote for a candidate not directly representing their group. Because the policy
preference of the unskilled workers is the most intermediate, other groups may
choose to side with this policy choice in order to avoid their least preferred can-
didate. For the unskilled workers, inequality plays a key role in determining the
degree of redistribution. Therefore, immigration ultimately affects the generosity
of the welfare state by altering the level of inequality in the economy.
The objectives of the second chapter are twofold. First, the chapter tries to
understand the relationship between immigration and asset prices. The analysis
reveals that the asset price responds positively to immigration. The immigra-
tion’s influence goes through four channels: increasing saving, increasing marginal
product of capital, decreasing marginal cost of investment, and raising population
growth rate. After the preceding analysis, I study how different cohorts will har-
ness these benefits through political interactions. This exercise reveals that the
young cohort may have a strategic motive to influence the identity of the decisive
voter in the next period to ensure the highest return on their savings in retirement.
In addition, the model also predicts that the uncertainty in the population growth
rate of the immigrants will lower these immigration quotas.
The last chapter moves away from international policy arena and focuses do-
mestically on escaping a poverty trap. Prior studies conclude that redistribution
is a futile policy against this vicious cycle of poverty. I revisit this line of literature
and show contrary to this conclusion that redistribution can help the economy
escape the poverty trap. I characterize a necessary sequence of lump-sum taxes
and transfers and show that this scheme will move the economy out of the poverty
trap in finite time regardless of the economy’s initial distribution of wealth. Un-
fortunately, I also show that neither basic democracy nor dictatorship can take
the economy there with this policy scheme. The rationale for this is the follow-
ing. The proposed escape route from poverty requires an economic input from the
richer group. However, the shift in the decisive political influence during the path
of development, from the hands of the poor to the hands of the rich, will put an
end to this pro-poor policy scheme.
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CHAPTER 1
REDISTRIBUTION POLICY AND IMMIGRATION POLICY: A
DYNAMIC POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS
1.1 Introduction
A welfare state operates both inter- and intra-generational redistribution. The
political system chooses the size of the welfare state to provide benefits to the
participants in the economy. In this regard, not only the citizens of the economy
contribute to and benefit from the welfare state, immigrants also contribute and
benefit as well. The objective of this chapter is to study a joint determination of re-
distribution policy and immigration policy. In particular, the redistribution policy
in mind must have both inter- and intra-generational dimensions to it, resembling
a welfare state.
I utilize a two-period-lived, overlapping-generations model. The old cohort re-
tires, while the young cohort works. I divide the young cohort into two skill levels:
skilled and unskilled, characterized by the level of wage they earn. The welfare-
state system is modeled simply as a proportional tax on income of all workers to
finance an equal transfer (a demogrant) to all agents in the economy in a balanced
budget manner. Therefore, everyone benefits from the transfer, but some will
bear more costs than others. In addition to the tax-transfer policy, the economy
also has immigration. Immigration policies are composed of two variables: one
reflects the skill composition of the immigrants and the other captures the immi-
gration volume (per native young population). The skill composition is defined
as the proportion of the skilled among the entering immigrants. I characterize
subgame-perfect Markov (also known commonly as Markov-perfect) political eco-
1
nomic equilibria in the economy consisting of three groups of voters voting on
three policy variables: the tax level, the skill composition of immigrants, and the
immigration volume. As a benchmark, I start with sincere voting where the largest
group always decides the fate of the policies. However, when having more than
two groups participating in the political decision, sincere voting behavior is clearly
inadequate. To remedy this shortfall, I then allow for strategic voting among the
voters, which opens up the possibility for strategic political coalition.
There have been previous works on the political economy of immigration poli-
cies, see for examples Benhabib [1996] and Ortega [2005]. For works on exogenous
immigration policy and the political economy of redistribution policy, see Razin,
Sadka, and Swagel [2002], and Casarico and Devillanova [2003]. Works that ad-
dress the joint political economic determination of both types of policy are scant,
however. Sand and Razin [2007] pioneers as the first political economy model
jointly determining the inter-generational redistribution and immigration. Dolmas
and Huffman [2004] and Ortega [2004] analyze similarly the joint determination
of intra-generational redistribution and immigration policy in a dynamic political
economy model. My analysis amalgamates these two lines of research, allowing for
a redistribution across both inter- and intra-generations.
The potential impacts of immigrants on the social security and the welfare state
have been studied quite extensively in the literature. See, for example, Smith and
Edmonston [1997], which studies different effects of immigrants on the U.S. econ-
omy. Most closely related to my dynamic setting are the works by Auerbach and
Oreopoulos [1999], Bonin, Raffelhuschen, and Walliser [2000], utilizing a partial
equilibrium generational accounting exercise, and Storesletten [2000], employing a
dynamic general equilibrium approach. These authors calculate numerically the
2
costs and benefits of different types of immigrants overtime. In conclusion, they
all agree that skilled immigrants have the most potential when it comes to rescu-
ing the frail fiscal system. High-skill immigrants are much more beneficial than
low-skill immigrants for the economy, in both short and long term. I incorporate
this insight into my model.
On the literature focusing on the sustainability of the social security, for exam-
ple Cooley and Soares [1999], and Boldrin and Rustichini [2000], and the welfare
state in Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten, and Zilibotti [2003], I offer addi-
tional insights. Intuitively, the skilled workers will be against redistribution as
they bear all the fiscal burden. Therefore, letting in too many skilled immigrants,
whose children are also skilled1, will lead to an abolishment of the welfare state in
the future. Voters, who will be the future beneficiaries of the system, would have
an incentive to restrict the amount of skilled immigrants entering the country. This
similar channel is fleshed out in Sand and Razin [2007] for the case of young-old
conflict, albeit requiring of a negative population growth rate of the natives, and
in Dolmas and Huffman [2004], and subsequently in Ortega [2004], for the case of
skilled-unskilled conflict. It bears a common feature with models using subgame-
perfect Markov equilibrium concept where voters in this period exert influence on
the distribution of voters in the next period.
As a by-product from my analysis, I show how the welfare state inline with the
preference the unskilled workers would often emerge out of the political process.
This adds an interesting angle to the conclusion from Hassler et. al. [20]. When
I allow different groups in the economy to vote strategically, both the skilled and
1Black, Devereux, and Salvanes [2005] argues that persistence in education inequality across
generations come more primarily from innate ability, rather than education itself. On the con-
trary, Sacerdote [2002] provides evidence that adoptees going into a high socioeconomic status
are likely to achieve higher educational level.
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the old voters would vote for the candidate representing the unskilled workers in
order to avoid the least-preferred candidate from winning. Hence, even without the
unskilled young forming the largest group in the economy, their preferred policies
become the most commonly observed in equilibrium. Most notable among these
policies is the tax rate, which indirectly determines the size of the welfare state.
The unskilled workers will demand more redistribution when the inequality in the
economy increases. In addition, the existence of fiscal leakages both to the native
beneficiaries (old or unskilled) and the immigrants may lead to a smaller welfare
state. These findings confirm the channels previously studied in Razin, Sadka, and
Swagel [2002a, 2002b].
Lastly, I also contribute to a rapidly growing field of dynamic political econ-
omy, in particular to those employing Markov-perfect as the equilibrium concept.
This class of models typically adopts majority voting to resolve conflicts between
two groups, hence the group with a dominant size always decides the policy out-
come. In this chapter, I allow for political interactions between more than two
groups. I build on the work by Besley and Coate [1998] who study a representa-
tive democracy in a two-period dynamic environment. In their analysis, the voters
take the winning probability of a candidate into their consideration when choosing
who to vote for. Although extremely insightful, their approach becomes increas-
ingly entangled with complications arising from massive voting indeterminacy and
endogeneous candidate selections. These details make their model virtually in-
tractable when extending beyond two periods. To deal with these problems, I take
away the candidate endogeneity and force the subgame-perfect Markov property
on the voting equilibrium. These produce a much more manageable equilibrium
with intuitive explanations.
4
The chapter proceeds as follow. Section 2 lays out the setup of the benchmark
model with fixed wages. In Section 3, I start analyzing the political equilibrium
using the model. First, I provide a benchmark by characterizing the political
outcome under the assumption of sincere voting. Then I allow strategic-voting
behaviors in the latter part of the section. Section 4 endogenizes the wages as
determined by the labor markets. I summarize my findings in Section 5 as the
conclusion.
1.2 The Basic Model
Consider an economy consisting of overlapping generations. Each individual lives
for two periods, working in the first period of their lives and retiring when old. The
population is divided into two groups according to their exogenously given skills:
skilled (s) and unskilled (u). The old generation does not work. The preference of













U o(cot ) = c
o
t . (1.2)
where h ∈ {s, u}, and s and u denote skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.
Furthermore, y and o correspond to young’s and old’s utility and consumption, ε
denotes the elasticity of labor supply, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Agents
in the economy maximize the above utility functions subject to individual’s budget
constraint. With this preference, equilibrium interest rate equals r = 1
β
− 1 and
individuals have no incentive to save, so I take saving to be zero for simplicity.2
2Assuming no saving is for pure convenience. With saving, because old individuals do not
work the last period of their life, they will consume savings plus any transfer. Through both
these channels, the old individuals benefit from immigration. To keep the analysis to a minimal,
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This reduces the two groups of old retirees (skilled and unskilled) to just one
because they have identical preference irrespective of their skill level.
The consumption good is produced by using the two types of labor as perfect
substitute with constant marginal products.3 The production function is given by
Yt = At (w
sLst + w
uLut )
where u and s denote unskilled and skilled labor, and At denotes Hicks-neutral
productivity factor, which is treated as deterministic. Labor markets are compet-
itive, ensuring the wages going to the skilled and unskilled workers are ωst = Atw
s
and ωut = Atw
u, respectively. I assume ws > wu.
There is a transfer to everyone in the economy at time t, Tt, financed by a
uniform tax across all working individuals, τt. Following Razin et. al. [2002a],
a combination of linear tax and a lump-sum cash grant represents a good ap-
proximation of the best egalitarian income tax. In addition to a social security
consideration, one can think of the demogrant as the usage of public services by
each citizens. I will postpone a detailed description of the the fiscal institution
to below. The agents in the economy make economic decisions taking these pol-
icy variables as given. Since the old generation has no income, its only source of
consumption comes from the transfer. With linear production technology above





h(1− τ))ε , (1.3)
I will just focus on the costs and benefits in terms of the welfare state. This practice is inline with
some recent dynamic models of political economy, for example Hassler et. al. [2003], and Doepke
and Zilibotti [2005]. Interested readers in more extensive models with savings are referred to the
literature on political economy of social security, for example Cooley and Soares [1999], Boldrin
and Rustichini [2000] , and Forni [2004].
3This simplification, nonetheless, allows me to focus solely on the linkages between the welfare
state and immigration, leaving aside any labor market consideration. I consider a model with
flexible wages below.
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for h ∈ {s, u}. Putting everything together yield the following indirect utility







+ Tt + βTt+1
V o = Tt,
for h ∈ {s, u}.
1.2.1 Demography, Heterogeneity, and Labor
Apart from the tax-transfer policy, the political process also selects immigration
policy. This policy consists of two parts: one selecting the volume of immigration,
and the other selecting the skill composition. I denote with µt as the ratio of
immigrants to the native-born young population and denote with σt the fraction of
skilled immigrants entering the country in period t. Both of these policy variables
are restricted to be in a unit interval.
Immigrants have identical preference to the natives. All immigrants come
young, so there will never be an entering retired immigrant. I assume all im-
migrants are naturalized in one period after their entrance.4 Hence they gain
voting power one period after their admittance as old retirees.
I let st denote the fraction of skilled workers in the labor force in period t
(where s0 > 0). The aggregate labor supply of each type of labor is
Lst = (st + σtµt)Ntl
s
t
Lut = (1− st + (1− σt)µt)Ntlut ,
4For this model, it is equivalent to roughly 30 years.
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where Nt is the number of native-born young individuals in period t.
The dynamics of the economy are given by the two population dynamics: one
governs the aggregate population, while the other governs the skill dynamics. Since
skills are not endogeneous within the model, I assume for simplicity that the off-
springs replicate exactly the skill level of their parents.5 That is,
Nt+1 = [1 + n+ (1 +m)µt]Nt (1.4)
st+1Nt+1 = [(1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt]Nt,
where n and m are growth rate of natives and immigrants, respectively. I restrict
n,m ∈ [−1, 1] and n < m. These parameters will be crucial in analyzing any de-
mographic benefits of immigration in addition to its economic benefits. Combining
the two equations together, the skill dynamics can be re-written in a compact form
as follows
st+1 =
(1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt
1 + n+ (1 +m)µt
. (1.5)
Equation (1.5) tells me that the next period’s fraction of skilled in the labor force
will be higher than the present period when the proportion of skilled immigrants in
this period is higher than that of the natives, σt > st. With this setup, immigration
is the only way to influence the state variable, st+1.
1.2.2 Fiscal Institution
I model the fiscal institution as operating with a balanced budget every period. As
noted earlier, all workers pay tax at a proportional rate of τt to their incomes, and
5Razin, Sadka, and Swagel [2002a] and Casarico and Devillanova [2003] provide a coherent
synthesis with endogeneous skill analysis. The first work focuses on the shift in skill distribution
of current population, while the latter studies skill-upgrading of future population.
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all individuals in the economy benefit equally in the form of per capita transfer,
Tt. There are no other government spending in the economy.
The cohort size of the workers is (1 + µt)Nt and of retirees is (1 + µt−1)Nt−1.
In period t, the tax revenue collected from the skilled and unskilled workers is
τt{ωst (st + σtµt)Ntlst + ωut (1− st + (1− σt)µt)Ntlut }. Balanced-budget condition
translates algebraically to
Tt =




t + (1− st + (1− σt)µt)ωut lut )




where the individual’s labor supply equations are given above in equation (1.3).
Tt
(




is government spending per worker. Note that an in-
crease in immigration or a fall in population growth increases the burden to the
working population. I also want to reemphasize here that, due to the nature of
this tax and transfer system, the fiscal system provides a channel for redistribution
across both inter- and intra-generation.
I end this subsection with an observation on next period’s transfer, Tt+1. It
will be increasing in period t’s skill composition of the immigrants, as long as
there are some immigrants. In addition, only when the proportion of the skilled in
immigrants is higher than in native young will the volume of immigration today
helps increase the future transfer. To verify this algebraically, the transfer in period
t+ 1 is given by,
Tt+1 =
τt+1 (1− τt+1)εA1+εt+1




(st+1 + µt+1σt+1) (w
s)1+ε
+ (1− st+1 + µt+1(1− σt+1))(wu)1+ε
}
.
With a little rearrangement, the equation reveals that, as long as ws > wu, next
period’s transfer increases if the proportion of next period native skilled increases.
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(1 + n)(1 +m)(σt − st)
(1 + n+ µt(1 +m))
2 .
The first quantity is always positive as long as there are a positive level of im-
migration. The second quantity will only be positive when the skilled fraction of
immigrants is higher than of natives. Lastly, the quantity in the denominator of
Tt+1 is always decreasing in µt. Together, I get the conclusion stated above. Clearly
the transfer in period t + 1 will not influence the political decision of period t’s
old cohort. However, both types of young individuals will have to take this future
benefit of immigrants into their account when vote.
1.3 Political Equilibria
In this essay, I focus on subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium. Imagine the economy
with three candidates representing each group of voters. With three groups of
voters, how I specify the rules of their interaction within the political process is
of utmost importance. I first consider the simplest case, where all voters vote
sincerely. However, the resulting policies will not be an equilibrium under most
circumstances, so I refer to them instead as ”outcome.” In the latter subsection, I
relax the restriction on voting behavior to allow for strategic voting and find the
political economic equilibrium of the model.
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1.3.1 Sincere Voting Outcome
In this subsection, I focus on ”sincere voting.” Sincere voting refers to a voting
behavior in which individuals vote according to their sincere preference irrespective
of the what the final outcome of the political process may be. Consequently, if all
voters vote sincerely, plurality rules imply that the largest group in the economy
always wins and implement their preferred policies. This is the usual assumption
in many political economy models with only two groups of voters. Formally, I
define a sincere political outcome as follows.
Definition 1. The policy function Ξt = 〈τt, σt, µt〉 constitutes a Subgame-perfect
Markov Outcome with Sincere Voting if




(1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt
1 + n+ (1 +m)µt
,
where d ∈ {s, u, o} is the identity of the largest group in the economy.
With this restricted voting behavior, the largest group of voters will always
have the decisive power, so they will implement their preferred policies in this
period. However, the voters realize that policy choice in the next period also
matter to them and their choice of policies in this period will affect the choice
of the next period’s policies through the state variable, st+1. Thus the decisive
group must choose this period’s policies optimally in a forward-looking manner.
This consideration proves intractable without any more restriction on the policy
functional space. A typical solution is to employ the Markov-perfect restriction
that requires the resulting policy function in period t+1 to take the same functional
form as the policy function in period t. The stationarity of the policy function
implies that it will be time-independent, except possibly through the state variable.
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The following proposition applies this outcome concept and captures what happens
if all individuals in this economy vote sincerely.6
Proposition 2 (Sincere-voting Markov Outcome). The following policy function
forms a Subgame-perfect Markov Outcome with Sincere Voting.
τ ∗t =






, if the unskilled is the largest
1
1+ε
, if the old is the largest
σ∗t =

1 , if either young is the largest and st ∈ [0, 11+n)
σ̂ < 1
2
, if the skilled is the largest and st ≥ 11+n





, if the unskilled is the largest and Ψ > 0 or
if the skilled is the largest and st ∈ [0, 11+n)
µ̂ < 1 , if the skilled is the largest and st ≥ 11+n
1
, if the unskilled is the largest and Ψ ≤ 0
or if the old is the largest.
where J∗ = J(µ∗t , σ
∗
t , st, µt−1), Ψ = Ψ(σ
u





), σ̂, and µ̂ are given
in the appendix.
The proof is in the Appendix. Intuitively, the skilled is the net contributor
to the welfare state, while the other two groups are net beneficiaries. If the old
cohort is the largest, it wants maximal social security benefits, meaning taxing to
the Laffer point ( 1
1+ε
). They also allow the maximal number of skilled immigrants
in to the economy because of the tax contribution this generates to the welfare
system. When the unskilled group is the largest, it is interesting to note that,
6I provide supplementary analysis on the population accounting of who forms the largest
group, and how to influence the next period’s identity of largest group in the Appendix A.2 and
A.3.
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although the unskilled young is a net beneficiary in this welfare state, they are
still paying taxes. Hence the preferred tax policy of the unskilled voters is smaller
than the Laffer point with a wedge 1
J∗ . I will provide further discussions on this
deviation factor below. Clearly, the unskilled workers also prefer to let in more
skilled immigrants due to their contribution to the welfare state. How many will
they let in depends on the function Ψ, which weighs the future benefits with the
cost today. Basically, if the unskilled workers are not forward-looking, it is in their
best interest to let in as many skilled immigrants as possible. However, this will
lead to no redistribution in the next period because the skilled workers will be the
largest. Hence, the function Ψ is the difference between the benefits they get by
being forward-looking and shortsighted.
The skilled natives prefer more skilled immigrants for a different reason from
the earlier two groups. They prefer skilled immigrants in this case because this will
provide a higher number of skilled native in the next period. Thus, if the skilled
are forward-looking, they too will prefer more skilled workers in their retirement
period. However, they cannot let in too many as this skilled workers in the next
period would be the largest group and vote to abolish the welfare state altogether.
Note that, given the production function, wages for both workers are constant
here. Therefore, the only incentive for more immigrants is to expand the tax base.
I will take up the issue relating to labor markets in the next section.
A common feature among political economic models with Markov-perfect con-
cept is the idea that today’s voters have the power to influence the identity of
future policymakers. Such feature is also prominent in my analysis here. The im-
migration policy of either young group reflects the fact that they may want to put
themselves as the largest old group in the next period. Thus, instead of letting in
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too many immigrants, who will give birth to a large new skilled generation, they
will want to let in as much as possible before the threshold is crossed. This thresh-
old is 1−(1+n)st
m
. This strategic motive on immigration policy is previously fleshed
out in Sand and Razin [2007]. Letting st = 1 gets the result of these authors.
There are two differences between my result and the one presented in their paper,
however. First, the equilibrium here has a bite even if the population growth rate
is positive, which is not the case when there are only young and old cohort, as in
Sand and Razin [2007], unless the model exhibits a negative population growth
rate. Another fundamental difference is that, in order to have some transfer in the
economy, the young decisive largest group has a choice of placing the next period’s
decisive power either in the hand of next period’s unskilled or old. So I need to
verify an additional condition that it is better for this period’s decisive young to
choose the old generation next period, which is the case.
When st ≥ 11+n , I have a unique situation (only possible when n > 0). In this
range of values, the number of skilled is growing too fast to be curbed by reducing
immigration volume alone. To ensure that the decisive power lands in the right
hand, the skilled voters (who are the largest in this period) must make the un-
skilled cohort grow to weigh down the growth rate of the skilled workers. This is
done by restricting the skill composition as well as the size of total immigration.
Empirically, with the population growth rate of the major host countries for im-
migration like the U.S. and Europe going below 1%, it is unlikely that this case
should ever be of much concern.7
The tax choice of the unskilled young deserves an independent discussion. In
7Barro and Lee [2000] provides an approximation of the size of the skilled. While Barro and
Lee statistics capture those 25 years and above, they also cite OECD statistics which capture
age group between 25 and 64. The percentage of this group who received tertiary education or
higher in developed countries falls in the range of 15% to 47%.
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the work by Razin et. al. [2002a], the authors find that the ”fiscal leakage” to the
immigrants may result in a lower tax. There are no immigration policy variable
in their analysis, and they assume that all immigrants possess lower skill than the
natives. Since this increases the burden of the fiscal system, the median voter
vote to reduce the size of the welfare state, instead of increasing it. To see such a
resemblance of my result with those of these authors, I must first take immigration
volume, µt, and the skill composition, σt, as exogeneous. The preferred tax rate of




1 + ε− 1
J
,






+ 1− st + (1− σt)µt




One can easily verify from these two expressions that
∂τut
∂σt
> 0, and there exists σ
such that, for any σt < σ, I have
∂τut
∂µt
< 0. Conversely, for any σt > σ, I would
get an expansion of the welfare state, because
∂τut
∂µt
> 0.8 The inequalities show
that higher number of skilled immigrants will prompt a higher demand for intra-
generational redistribution. The fiscal leakage channel captures in essence that
unskilled immigration creates more fiscal burden, such that the decisive ”unskilled”
voters would rather have the welfare state shrinks. In addition, an increase in
inequality in the economy, reflected in the skill premium ratio
wst
wut
, leads to a larger
welfare state demanded by the unskilled.
8My use of ”shrink” and ”expand” should be properly justified. Recall that the tax rate
preferred by the unskilled young worker is less than the level that is preferred by the old retirees.
The tax rate preferred by the old retirees, τot =
1
1+ε is the Laffer point that attains the maximum
welfare size, given immigration policies. Therefore the size of the welfare state is monotonic in
the tax rate when τ ∈ [0, 11+ε ].
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1.3.2 Strategic Voting Equilibrium
When there are multiple electorates voting on policies, the assumption of sincere
voting is inadequate. After all, people do not always vote for their most sincerely
preferred policy, but instead for the best policy that most likely will win the elec-
tion. Such a behavior is referred to as ”strategic voting” in the literature. Voting
strategically requires all voters to take into their consideration the likelihood that
such a policy will be implemented. To allow for strategic voting, I need more
apparatuses. I start by discussing some necessary assumptions to make the model
tractable.
Assumption 1. Voters with the identical preference vote identically.
This assumption simply says that all skilled vote identically, all unskilled vote
identically, and all old vote identically. It enables me to forego considering splitting
tickets, and vote division within group. Consequently, I only need to look at its
representative in order to understand voting behavior of a population group.
Assumption 2. Three candidates, one representing each group (skilled, unskilled,
and old), submit their proposal for votes.
Unlike the work by Besley and Coate [1997,1998], I do not endogenize the
number candidates here, so there are no direct cost of running for office. However,
I would imagine that there is an ”elective cost” of putting two identical candidates
from the same group on the ballot. Alternatively, I can think of the election as
a choice of delegation to an individual in the economy to implement the policies.
Since there are only three types of individuals in the economy, the delegation will
go to one of the three types in the fashion of a citizen-candidates model.9
9For seminal works on citizen-candidates model, see Osborne and Slivinski [1996] for sincere
voting, and Besley and Coate [1997] for strategic voting setup.
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Assumption 3. No commitment mechanism for policy implementation.
Under Assumption 2, the implementation power will be in the hands of one of
the three types of individuals. Similar to Besley and Coate [1997], I assume that
there are no commitment mechanism in the economy. Usually, reputation and
reelection motives provide a punishment channel for failing to deliver the promise.
Such mechanisms also allow candidates to change and commit to different policy
platform to vie for more votes in the election. I assume these are absent from the
model. Therefore, the winning candidate cannot credibly commit to implement
a policy other than his own ideal policy, representing the demographic group he
belongs to.
Assumption 4. No abstention.
Voting abstention is a subject of a large literature. I forbid abstention from the
model because, under Assumption 1, this reduces the political game to a simple
”restricted” median voter game. In addition, without abstention, I am guaranteed
to have a policy outcome without a need for an exogenously-defined default policy.
Voting Decisions. With an abuse of notation, let the set of three candidates
be {s, u, o}, denoting their identity. Then, the decision to vote of any individual
must be optimal under the correctly anticipated probability of winning and policy
stance of each candidate. Under Assumption 1, I can focus on the decision of
a representative voter from each group. Let eit ∈ {s, u, o} be the vote of the







t ) is a voting equilibrium at time t if






) | eit ∈ {s, u, o}
 (1.8)
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for i ∈ {s, u, o}, where Pj(eit, e∗−it) denotes the probability that candidate j ∈
{s, u, o} will win given the voting decisions, and e∗−it is the optimal voting decision
of other groups that is not i10, and Ξjt =
〈






is the policy vector if candidate
j wins. For instance, under plurality rule, Pj(e∗t ) = 1 if j is the identity of the
group with absolute majority in the economy.11 I require each vote casted by each
group be a best-response to the votes casted by the other groups. In addition,
because Assumption 1 mandates identical voting from individuals of the same
characteristics, the representative voter of each group must take into the account
the pivotal power of their vote.
The voting decision of the old voters can be simplified, since they have no
concern for the future,
eo∗t = arg max
 ∑
j∈{s,u,o}
Pj(eot , e∗−ot)V i
(





) | eot ∈ {s, u, o}
 .
Notice that my voting equilibrium requires voters to be forward-looking, rather
than retrospective.
Assumption 5. Each voting decision is not a weakly dominated voting strategy.12
Weakly dominated voting strategy typically invites massive indeterminacy into
the model, so I try to avoid such a foreseeable pitfall. As an example of such
equilibrium, suppose the three groups have the same weight (think one vote per
10The setup for voting equilibrium borrows heavily from Besley and Coate [1997, 1998].
11A group is the absolute majority in the economy if its size is more than 50% of the voting
population in the economy.
12Following Besley and Coate [1997], a voting decision eit is weakly dominated for i if there
exists êi ∈ {s, u, o} such that∑
j∈{s,u,o}















group, without loss of generality), then if all three cast votes for the worst possible
option, this will still satisfy the definition of the voting equilibrium. No group can
unilaterally makes itself better off. Ruling out weakly dominated voting strategy
rules out this undesirable equilibrium.
Tallying the Votes. The votes are tallied by adding up the size of each group
that have chosen to vote for the candidate. The candidate with the most votes
wins the election and gets to implement his ideal set of policies.
Clearly, each individual prefers the ideal policies of their representative can-
didate. Strategic voting opens up the possibility of voting for someone else that
is not their representative candidate to avoid the least favorable policies. For the
skilled young, they prefer the least amount of taxes and some immigration for the
future. Thus they will prefer the policy choice of the unskilled over the old. As for
the old retirees, the more the transfer benefits, the better. Clearly, the unskilled
promises some benefits while the skilled promises none, so they would choose the
policies of the unskilled over the skilled.
As for the unskilled workers, both rankings are possible: either they prefer the
policy choice of the skilled over the old, or vice versa. The parameters of the model
will dictate the direction of their votes. The cut-off tax policy, τ˜ , is the break-even
point for the unskilled voters between preferring some positive tax but receiving







Figure 1.1: Utility in period t of the unskilled worker as a function of the tax
rate, τt.
skilled candidate). This is depicted in Figure 1.13 This cut-off tax rate will play
an important role for the unskilled young’ voting decision.
More generally, the main problem with ranking the utility streams of the voters
is due the multiplicity of future equilibria once I extend my model to strategic
voting behaviors. This makes it impossible for the (young) voters to get a precise
prediction of what will happen as a result of their action today. Even if I could
pin down all the relative sizes of all possible payoffs in the next period, multiple










(st + σtµt) (ws)
1+ε + (1− st + (1− σt)µt) (wu)1+ε
)




I know that such a tax policy exists, because, take next period’s policy as given, the payoff in
this period to the unskilled is maximized at its preferred policy and zero at τ = 1. Therefore, at
some τ˜ , the equality will hold.
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voting equilibria do not allow a prediction of which equilibrium will be selected in
the future. To deal with the problem, I force the voting equilibrium to satisfy a
stationary Markov property, similarly to the policy choices in previous subsection.
Now, I am ready to define the subgame-perfect Markov political equilibrium under
strategic voting.
Definition 3. The policy function Ξt = 〈τt, σt, µt〉 with the voting profile e∗t con-
stitutes a Subgame-perfect Markov Equlibrium with Strategic Voting if
Ξt = Ξ(st,Ξt−1, e∗t ) = arg max
τt,σt,µt




(1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt
1 + n+ (1 +m)µt
,
where d ∈ {s, u, o} is the identity of the the winning candidate, decided by the
voting equilibrium e∗t that satisfies equation Assumption 1-5 and the Subgame-
perfect Markov property for all i ∈ {s, u, o},









∗ (st+1,Ξt, e∗t )
) (1.9)
where Pj(eit, e∗−it) denotes the winning probability of the representative candidate
j ∈ {s, u, o} given the voting decisions, and e∗−it is the optimal voting decision of
other groups that is not i, and Ξjt =
〈






is the vector of preferred policy of
candidate from group j.
The stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium defined above introduces the second
functional exercise. The first exercise is to find a policy profile that satisfies the
usual Markov-perfect definition, as discussed in the Sincere Voting subsection. The
second exercise forces the voting decision to be casted on the belief that individuals
in the same situation in the next period will vote in exactly the same way. With
this property, the voters in this period know exactly how future generations will
vote and can evaluate the stream of payoffs accordingly.
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Lastly, the keep the analysis to a minimal, I focus on voting equilibria which
feature the largest group always voting for its representative candidate. In partic-
ular, if a group forms the absolute majority, all votes from this group will go to its
representative candidate. This is consistent with the behavior from the equilibrium
definition.
For the purpose of my analysis, I assume currently no group holds the absolute
majority in the economy. The first equilibrium I look at is dubbed ”intermediate
policy” because it captures the essence that the preferred policies of the unskilled
workers are a compromise from the extremity of the other two groups.
Proposition 4 (Intermediate Policy Equilibrium). The following strategy profile
forms a Subgame-perfect Markov Equilibrium with Strategic Voting
es∗t =






 o , if
1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
≥ max{st, 1− st}
u , otherwise






1 + ε− 1
J∗
, σ∗t = 1, µ
∗
t =
2 + n− 2(1 + n)st
m
〉
where J∗ = J(µ∗t , σ
∗
t , st, µt−1) is given in the appendix for Proposition 2.
14 The
economy can go through different equilibrium paths. 1.) If n + m ≤ 0, the old
group is always the absolute majority. Tax rate is at the Laffer point and the
economy is fully open to skilled migration. 2.) If n + m > 0, then the dynamics
14The volume of immigration, µ∗t =
2+n−2(1+n)st
m , reflects that fact that the threshold value
for this variable has been pushed slightly farther. As long as the skilled voters never form the
absolute majority, the policies in the proposition will always be implemented, even if the skilled
voters are the largest group in the economy.
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will have the skilled
workers as the absolute majority, and zero tax rate with limited skilled migration.
n
2(1+n)
≥ s0 will have the unskilled workers as the absolute majority, with positive
tax rate (not Laffer) and some skilled migration. n < 0 will initially place old cohort
as the absolute majority with Laffer point tax rate and maximal skilled migration.
Otherwise, the policies implemented are given above.
The proof is provided in the appendix. The equilibrium features the unskilled
voters always voting for their representative, while the other two groups vote for
their respective candidate only if they are the largest group, or for the unskilled
candidate otherwise. With these votes, the policies favored by the unskilled young
will be implemented almost always, except for when the old or the skilled voters
form absolute majority. One notable difference is the policy related to the immi-
gration volume. In period t + 1, as long as the skilled workers do not form 50%
of the voting population, the policies preferred by the unskilled workers will be
implemented. To make sure that this is the case, skilled migration is restricted to
just the threshold that would have put the skilled voters as the absolute majority
in period t+ 1. This level is higher than the restricted volume in Proposition 2.
In the preceding analysis, I let the choice of the skilled workers and the old
retirees decide the fate of the the policies. In the following analysis, the unskilled
workers consider who they want to vote for. This will depend on how extractive
the tax policy preferred by the old is. I call the next equilibrium ”Left-wing”,
because it features a welfare state of the size greater-than-or-equal to that of the
intermediate policy equilibrium. This may arise when the tax rate preferred by
the old voters is not excessively redistributive.
Proposition 5 (Left-wing Equilibrium). When 1
1+ε
≤ τ˜ , the following strategy
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profile forms a Subgame-perfect Markov Equilibrium with Strategic Voting
es∗t =
 s , otherwiseu , if 1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
















































where J∗ = J(µ∗t , σ
∗
t , st, µt−1) comes from Proposition 2 and τ˜ is given in the
appendix. The economy can go through different equilibrium paths. 1.) If n+m ≤
0, the old group is always the absolute majority. Tax rate is at the Laffer point and
the economy is fully open to skilled migration. 2.) If n+m > 0, then the dynamics




will have the skilled
workers as the absolute majority, and zero tax rate with limited skilled migration.
n
2(1+n)
≥ s0 will have the unskilled workers as the absolute majority, with positive
tax rate (not Laffer) and some skilled migration. n < 0 will initially place old cohort
as the absolute majority with Laffer point tax rate and maximal skilled migration.
Otherwise, the policies implemented are given above.
The proof for the proposition is provided in the appendix. When the tax
rate preferred by the old voters is not excessively redistributive in the eyes of the
unskilled, I could have an equilibrium where the unskilled voters strategically vote
for the old candidate to avoid the policies preferred by the skilled voters. This
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will be an equilibrium when the size of the skilled is not ”too large.” Recall that,
voting to implement the policies selected by the old candidate leads to opening the
economy fully to the skilled immigrants. If the size of the skilled group is currently
too large, there is a risk of making the skilled voters the absolute majority in the
next period leading to no welfare state in the retirement of this period’s workers.




. Therefore, voting for the
old will only be compatible with the interest of the unskilled voters when the tax
rate is not excessively high and when the size of the skilled is not too large.
To contrast with the above proposition, I turn my attention to the next equi-
librium. When the Laffer point is higher than τ˜ , the tax rate is read as excessive.
In this case, the unskilled voters will instead choose to vote for the skilled over
the old candidate. The resulting equilibrium has the size of the welfare state less-
than-or-equal to that in the intermediate policy equilibrium, hence I refer to it as
”Right-wing.”
Proposition 6 (Right-wing Equilibrium). When 1
1+ε
> τ˜ , the following strategy
profile forms a Subgame-perfect Markov Equilibrium with Strategic Voting
es∗t =
 s , otherwiseu , if 1− st ≥ 1+µt−11+n+µt−1(1+m)
eu∗t =
 u , otherwises , if 1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
≥ max{st, 1− st}.
eo∗t =
 o , otherwiseu , if st ≥ 1+µt−11+n+µt−1(1+m)
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where J∗ = J(µ∗t , σ
∗
t , st, µt−1) comes from Proposition 2 and τ˜ is given in the
appendix. The economy can go through different equilibrium paths. 1.) If n+m ≤
0, the old group is always the absolute majority. Tax rate is at the Laffer point and
the economy is fully open to skilled migration. 2.) If n+m > 0, then the dynamics




will have the skilled
workers as the absolute majority, and zero tax rate with limited skilled migration.
n
2(1+n)
≥ s0 will have the unskilled workers as the absolute majority, with positive
tax rate (not Laffer) and some skilled migration. n < 0 will initially place old cohort
as the absolute majority with Laffer point tax rate and maximal skilled migration.
Otherwise, the policies implemented are given above.
I provide the proof in the appendix. When the tax preferred by the old is ex-
cessive from the perspective of the unskilled, the political process could implement
the policies preferred by the skilled in order to avoid the worst possible outcome.
This happens when the old voters constitute the largest group, and the unskilled
voters vote strategically for the skilled candidate. In other cases, however, the
policies preferred by the unskilled will be implemented, irrespective of the identity
of the largest group in the economy.
For my results with multidimensional policies, it is important to note here
that the ranking of candidates by individuals allows me to escape the well-known
agenda-setting cycle (the ”Condorcet paradox”). Such a cycle, which arises when
any candidate could be defeated in a pairwise majority voting competition, leads to
massive indeterminacy and non-existence of a political equilibrium. The agenda-
setting cycle will have a bite if the rankings of the candidates for all groups are
unique: no group occupies the same ranked position more than once. However,
this does not arise here, because, in all equilibria, some political groups have
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a common enemy. That is, because they will never vote for the least-preferred
candidate (the ”common” enemy), the voting cycle breaks down to determinate
policies above, albeit their multiplicity. This occurs when voters agree on who
is the least-preferred candidate and act together to block her from winning the
election. The literature typically avoids the Condorcet paradox by restricting
political preferences with some ad hoc assumptions. For my case, the preferences
induced from economic assumptions lead to the escape of the Condorcet paradox.
For discussions on agenda-setting cycle, see Drazen [2000, pp. 71-72], and Persson
and Tabellini [2000, pp. 29-31].
1.4 Endogeneous Wages
In this section, I modify the production function to allow for endogeneous wages.
I want to allow for interactions between two skill-groups in the production func-
tion, but in the most parsimonious way. The production function should capture
imperfect substitution between the two groups. Moreover, it should also display
any complementarity effects one skill group may have on the other. To stay in
line with all these requirements and parsimoniousness, I assume a Cobb-Douglas
production function using two skills as inputs to produce a single consumption
good. The output is therefore produced by the following production function:





where At is the deterministic Hicks-neutral productivity parameter similarly to
above, and α is the share of skilled income. The labor markets are assumed to be
competitive, hence the wage paid to the workers equal to marginal product of the
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The preference of agents in the economy is the same as above, making the individ-
ual labor supply equals to
lst = (w
s
t (1− τ))ε and lut = (wut (1− τ))ε ,
which can be aggregated to give aggregate labor supply in the same manner as
above. The two labor markets can be solved simultaneously to find the equilibrium
wage for the skilled and unskilled, yielding
(wst )
1+ε = α1+εα(1− α)ε(1−α)A1+εt
(





1+ε = αεα(1− α)1+ε(1−α)A1+εt
(
st + µtσt
1− st + µt(1− σt)
)α
. (1.11)
From the production function, there is really no distinct difference between skilled
and unskilled labor force, except from the fact that they are complementary to one
another. To resolve this, I assume that wst > w
u
t , which brings me to the inequality
α > st+µ
1+µ
. For sufficiency, I can assume α > 1+st
2
.15
1.4.1 Balanced-Budget Fiscal Institution
Similarly to the previous section, the budget must be balanced in all periods. I can
make use of equation (1.10) and (1.11) in the labor supply equations to simplify
15Given the nature of exogeneously given skilled distribution and the simple skill dynamics
(described in equation (1.5)), this inequality maybe broken in the very long run as st ↗ 1 when
t↗∞. I could instead assume a Markovian skill dynamics such that there positive probability of
being unskilled, depending on family background. For the purpose of my simple positive analysis
in period t, I think that the assumption suffices, as long as I do not attempt to positive analyze
the very long run or the steady-state behavior of the political system.
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the balanced-budget equation. I have the following
Tt
(
1 + µt +
1 + µt−1
1 + n+ µt−1(1 +m)
)




t + (1− st + (1− σt)µt)wut lut ) (1.12)
= τt(1− τt)εαεα(1− α)ε(1−α)A1+εt (st + µtσt)α (1− st + µt(1− σt))1−α .
The last equality follows from substituting for labor supply and wage equations
and simplifying some algebra.
The last quantity necessary is the indirect utility of the young (as the indirect







+ Tt + βTt+1
where h ∈ {s, u} denotes the skill level of the individual. Wages are given in
equation (1.10) and (1.11) for the skilled and unskilled, respectively, and the per-
capita transfer is from equation (1.12). Notice right away that, for the young,
immigrants affect them through two contemporaneous channels. The first channel
is through the labor markets, by either complementarity or substitutability. The
second channel comes from financing higher redistribution and transfer in this
period. With all these equipped, I can now turn my attention to the political
equilibrium.
1.4.2 Political Equilibrium
I focus on the sincere-voting political outcome for this section. Recall that for a
policy rule to constitute a Subgame-Perfect Markov Outcome with Sincere Voting
if the policy rule today takes into the account the policy variables that will be
implemented in the future using the same policy rule. In particular, the decisive
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voters must consider the effect that today’s policy will influence tomorrow’s policy
through the economy’s dynamics.
Proposition 7 (Sincere-voting Markov Outcome with Endogeneous Wage). The









, if the unskilled is the largest
1
1+ε
, if the old is the largest
σ∗t =

σst , if the skilled is the largest
1 , if the unskilled is the largest
1 , if the old is the largest.
µ∗t =

µst , if the skilled is the largest
1−(1+n)st
m
, if the unskilled is the largest and Ψ̂ > 0
1
, if the unskilled is the largest and Ψ̂ ≤ 0
or if the old is the largest.
where K∗ = K(µ∗t , σ
∗
t , st, µt−1), Ψ̂ = Ψ̂(σ
u





), σs, and µs are
given in the appendix.
I provide the proof in the Appendix. Notice that the proposition looks very
similar to the scenario with fixed wages. Nonetheless, there are two marked dif-
ferences. First, all incentives that drive the preference of agents in the economy
come through two channels: wage and transfer. The transfer channel is similar
to what I previously discussed under fixed wages. In addition now, through the
wage channel, the unskilled workers benefit from complementarity with the skilled
workers, lifting up its wage. Hence the unskilled young prefer even more skilled
immigration. How many will they let in depends on the function Ψ̂, which weighs
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future benefits with the cost today. The function Ψ̂ is the difference between the
utility they get by being forward-looking and shortsighted, similarly to the fixed
wage setup. The labor market channel is reversed for the skilled workers, who now
prefer unskilled immigrants due to their wage complementarity and shun skilled
migrants due to their competitive substitution. Nonetheless, the preference of the
skilled young is no longer as simple. On the one hand, they prefer unskilled over
the skilled immigrant because of the labor market interaction. On the other hand,
they want to bring more skilled immigrants whose skilled children would help sup-
port the welfare state in the next period. Recall that tax and transfer for this
period are zero when the majority is skilled. So any fiscal benefits of immigrants
to the skilled young only come next period. Although it seems that this depends
crucially on my assumption on the skill dynamics, it is not implausible to imagine a
similar consideration arising when children’s skill correlates strongly with parent’s.
Thus even with direct labor market competition, the skilled young may still have
incentives to let in skilled immigrants for reasons beyond labor market. As before,
the immigration choices reflect the strategy of the younger cohort trying to place
its older self as the largest group of voters in the next period.
It is worthwhile to consider the tax preference of the unskilled young in details. I
first take immigration volume, µt, and immigration composition, σt, as exogeneous.




1 + ε− 1
K
,
where K = K(µt, σt, st, µt−1) =
1− st + (1− σt)µt
(1− α)
(




A quick observation reveals that
∂τut
∂σt
< 0 for µt > 0 and
∂τut
∂st
< 0. That is,
more skilled population in the economy leads to lowering the tax burden. These
result has to be contrast with the scenario with fixed wage. Under fixed wage,
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more number of skilled means more intra-generational redistribution. With flexible
wages, the unskilled majority needs to consider more than just redistribution. Any
increase in the skilled composition increases both the unskilled wage and transfer,
while lowering the skilled wage. Nonetheless, the benefit to the unskilled cohort
through labor market is private, while through welfare-state is shared among all
citizens. By lowering tax rate, the unskilled young gets to enjoy the benefit of
higher wages from complementarity with skilled, albeit lower transfer. In this
more flexible-wage framework, a higher number of skilled workers also reduces the
tax rate preferred by the unskilled. Hence, under my specification, the larger
skill composition in the economy (both of the native-born and the immigrants)
automatically lowers wage differential in the economy, hence the need for intra-
generational transfer.
Inequality still plays an important role in the tax preference of the unskilled,
but through a different parameter. When, 1 − α, the share of income going to
the unskilled workers falls, tax rate rises to redistribute more heavily. This can be
thought along the line of higher inequality leads to more redistribution.16 The fiscal
leakage channel also reflects these automatic correction in wage differential across
the two working groups. It can be shown that there exists a cut-off composition,




and any σt > σ˜, I would get the opposite (
∂τut
∂µt
< 0). In words, more unskilled
composition of the immigrants creates more desire for redistribution, enlarging the
size of the welfare state.
Let me discuss briefly about the political equilibria with strategic voting be-
havior under flexible wages. Recall that, under fixed wages, political coalitions are
16In fact, more accurately, the relevant measure of inequality for this expression is share of the
income over the share of population, (1−α)1−st+(1−σt)µt . As this rises, the demand for redistribution
falls.
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formed either between the skilled and the unskilled workers or between the old
retirees and the unskilled workers. These formations continue to be true under the
case of flexible wages. The skilled workers prefer the least number of skilled immi-
grants and the lowest level of tax. Thus they will prefer the policy choice of the
unskilled over the old candidate. On the contrary, the old retirees want the highest
degree of skilled immigrants and the maximal size of the welfare state. Hence they
will prefer the policy choice of the unskilled over the skilled candidate. Which
candidate the unskilled workers decide to vote for depends on the gain from the
labor and the degree of redistribution of the Laffer point. All in all, the equilibria
will look almost identical to the one described in the preceding section.
1.5 Conclusion
To address the linkage between redistribution policy and immigration policy, I
build a dynamic political economy model featuring three groups of voters: skilled
workers, unskilled workers, and retirees. The model features both inter- and intra-
generational redistribution, resembling a welfare state. The skilled workers are
net contributors, while the unskilled workers and old retirees are net beneficiaries.
However, skilled immigrants also increase the political threat against the welfare
state because their offsprings, who are skilled, will vote against it in the next period.
Voters who will be net beneficiaries from the welfare state may have an incentive
to restrict the number of skilled immigrants such that the welfare state continues
to operate in the future. When the skilled cohort procreates rapidly (both due
to high population growth, and large initial size), it may be necessary to bring in
unskilled immigrants to counter balance the expanding size of the skilled group.
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I extend the class of dynamic political economy models using Subgame-perfect
Markov as equilibrium concept to allow for strategic voting behavior. This is
necessary when the economy has more than two types of electorates. It allows
voters to cast vote for a candidate not directly representing their sincere preference
to defeat their least preferred candidate. I find that the policies preference of
the unskilled natives are likely to prevail over that of the others. This is true
irrespective of the identity of the largest group of voters in the economy. The
policy preference of the unskilled is the most intermediate, making it an attractive
locus to avoid the worst possible policies. Because unskilled workers both pay taxes
to and benefit from the welfare state, inequality plays a key role in determining
the size of the tax rate and redistribution. Therefore, immigration ultimately
affects the generosity of the welfare state by affecting the level of inequality in the
economy.
Lastly, there is a large literature studying how social security would emerge
as a political equilibrium when the young generation forms the majority in the
economy. Much of the literature conclude that the necessary ingredient for such
an emergence is the aging of the economy and/or some other equilibrium mech-
anisms that imposes punitive cost if the social security system were to stop (see
for example, Cooley & Soares [1999], and Boldrin & Rustichini [2000]. My results
here suggest an additional perspective. I find that the social security system needs
not arise only from a conflict between young and old voters. If the welfare state
provides a vehicle for redistribution beyond just one dimension across generations,
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CHAPTER 2
IMMIGRATION AND ASSET PRICES: HOW DIFFERENT
COHORTS CAN BENEFIT
2.1 Introduction
Two recent policy-related debates (which are still on-going), namely, immigration
into the U.S. and consequences of aging demography on social security have led
me to consider a mutual viewpoint: how would a large aging political cohort
think about immigration into the country. The model for answering questions
about change in demographic structures have been around for a long time, but
only until recently have economists asked questions of causal relationships between
demographic structures and economic outcomes. This partially reflects the need
for answers to questions raised by the babyboomers about the babyboomers.
High fertility rate during the late 1950’s and early 1960’s creates the largest
demographic cohort that we know as the ”babyboomers” (see Figure 2.1). Half
a decade later, this same large cohort is on the verge of retirement. With falling
fertility rate and rising life-expectancy (Figure 2.2 and 2.3), the whole world seems
to age along the side of the babyboomers. All these contributed to an upward trend
in the old-age dependency ratio, as presented in Figure 2.4, putting more and more
pressure on the working-age group. The upward trend in the dependency ratio is
projected to continue well into the middle of the twenty-first century (projections
by the United Nations Population Division).
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. First, I try to understand the
relationship between immigration and asset prices. The analysis reveals that asset
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Immigration and Asset Prices 
How Different Cohorts Can Benefit 
Figure 1: Fertility Rate (expected number of children per woman).  
Figure 2: Life-expectancy (in years). 
















So urce: UN Po p ulat io n Divis io n
















Source: UN Population Division
Figure 2.1: Fertility Rate (expected number of children per woman).
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Figure 2.2: Life-expectancy (in years).
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Figure 4: Old dependency ratio (number of population higher than 65 per 100 of working 
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Figure 2.3: Median Age of Population (in years).
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Figure 2.4: Old dependency ratio (number of population higher than 65 per
100 of working age group).
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prices respond positively to immigration. It also predicts that immigration in the
present period positively affect asset prices in this period and the next. Then, once
I have found these effects, I ask how will different cohorts harness these benefits
through political interactions. I characterize analytically the political economic
equilibrium level of immigration, using the Markov-perfect equilibrium concept
pioneered by Krusell and Rios-Rull [1996], which is later solved for closed-form
solutions for the first time in Hassler, Rodriguez-Mora, Storesletten, and Zillibotti
[2003]. The concept has wide applicability and my application to immigration
is not the first. Sand and Razin [2007], in particular, has used the equilibrium
concept to shed lights on the question of social security sustainability and the role
of immigration. Ortega [2004, 2005] have also employed the concept to deal with
the dynamic choice of immigration policy.
The implications from this chapter with respect to aging demography con-
tribute to a couple lines of literatures. The first line focuses on the cost and
benefits of immigration. For some comprehensive treatments on economic impact
of immigration, see work commissioned by National Research Council [1997] and
Simon [1999]. A particular subset of these literatures under my consideration is
sustainability of social security system and migration. As the media have pop-
ularized, the PAYG social security system is on the brink of insolvency because
the world’s dependency ratio continues to rise. Many researchers and thinktanks
have called for an overhaul of the entire system. While the discussion remains in
limelight, another group of academic researchers consider a shorter-term solution
to the problem: immigration. Examples of these contributions are Storesletten
[2000], Razin and Sadka [2001], and Sand and Razin [2007]. Each of these stud-
ies approaches the problem from slightly different angles, but ultimately reach
the same conclusion: young immigrants could help lowering the burden of tax to
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support the withering social security. Other literatures on political economy of
immigration have similarly focused on expanding the tax base using this line of ar-
guments. In this chapter, I offer another viewpoint on the benefits of immigration
through their possible influence on asset prices. The pension funds are invested
in some form of assets, whether they’ll include stocks, bonds, or simply interest-
bearing accounts. Hence if we could find a way to sustain rate of returns on these
investment, we will have succeeded, at least partially, in releasing the pressures of
the current system. Although I do not claim to have a complete model to capture
such a complex social security investment process (as done in Abel [2003]), but
certainly, I have brought a new light to the issue. The point about increasing cap-
ital returns to native citizens from immigration as been brought into to discussion
before in Berry and Soligo [1969], however, their discussions and any subsequent
works fail to look the ”valuation” effects of immigration on asset prices. Other
economic literatures on immigration focus entirely on labor market and fiscal bur-
den, but rarely on other issues (recent exceptions are Saiz [2003, 2007], and Lach
[2007]).
My analysis also has another implication. There is a big literature focusing
on the stock market meltdown and the effect of babyboomers’ retirement. The
controversy reaches its peak with debates from both sides, one supporting the
argument for a major impact on the stock market (See, for example, Abel [2001,
2003], and Geanakoplos Et Al [2004]) while the other believing in less of an effect
(see for example Poterba [2001, 2004], and Brooks [2002, 2006]. On the one hand,
those strongly believe in the meltdown theory argue that the retirement of this
unusually large size babyboom cohort will cause a plunge in the value of the stock
markets. Earlier, this cohort has been saving on different assets pushing their
prices higher. As this large cohort retires and sells its lifetime assets to the smaller
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cohort, the supply exceeds the demand and asset prices fall. Such perspective
relies heavily on the life-cycle pattern of consumption. On the other hand, many
empirical works fail to find strong empirical linkages between demography and
asset returns. As Brooks [2006] points out, even if one finds empirical support for
the theory, it appears that many studies suffer seriously from spurious regression:
an external factor that affects both asset prices and fertility rates. In addition,
some evidence also suggests that households may not run down their accumulated
asset in retirements, as claimed by the earlier group whose logic is based on the
life-cycle hypothesis. In fact, Poterba [2001] and Brooks [2006] find that the survey
evidence suggests the reverse: households save more after retirement. My result
steps right inside of the circle. The model builds on the standard overlapping-
generations framework, so it is subjected to the scrutiny put forth against such
modeling techniques for this literature. However, even with such set up, I show
that asset prices may go up in response to this demographic shift. Given that the
babayboomers, a large cohort, will likely face unattractive asset markets in the
future, this cohort will use all of its political power to mitigate or even reverse the
effects. Surely one cannot expect such a politically powerful cohort to simply wait
for the natural economic law to decide its financial fate.
Using the results that stock market (through the behavior of Tobin’s q) will
respond positively to immigration flow, the chapter contributes to the two impor-
tant lines of research with an insight on how both stock market meltdown and
the fragility of pension system can be mitigated by allowing more immigration. In
other words, I provide another channel through which the native-born citizens can
benefit from immigration. Even though the wage earners may suffer from depress-
ing wage in the present period, a life-time consideration opens up a possible future
benefit of bringing in immigration to shore up population growth.
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The next section outlines the model under deterministic environment. I show
within this section that the asset prices will rise with immigration. The section
ends with an analysis of the political equilibrium. In section 3, I augment the
model with uncertainty and repeat the analysis of both economic and political
economic equilibrium. I provide some light empirical thoughts in section 4, citing
existing empirical works and paving the way for future empirical works. I conclude
in section 5.
2.2 Deterministic Model
Consider a 2-period-lived overlapping-generations model in the spirit of Diamond
[1965]. On the production side, I follow the work of Abel [2003]. I also augments
the model with the demographic structures from Sand and Razin [2007]. I start by
describing the technology and its structures. Then later I move on to the details
of consumers and demography.
2.2.1 Technologies
There is a single consumption good in this economy, produced with two factors:
capital (K) and labor (L). The production technology of the consumption good is






where α ∈ (0, 1).
In addition, the economy also produces a capital good to be used in production
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of the consumption good. This capital adjustment technology converts investment
and the current stock of capital into capital stock in the next period. The capital
production technology is also of Cobb-Douglas form, similar to Abel [2003] and







where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, Kt is the aggregate capital stock and It is the gross investment in
the economy in period t. Note that, under this specification of capital adjustment
technology, I implicitly assume full depreciation of capital from last period. This
capital technology is consistent with equation (4b) in Hayashi [1982]. Because of
its concavity with respect to It, I have a cost to capital adjustment.
1
Letting Rt, wt, and qt denote the rate of return, the wage in period t, and the
shadow price of capital carried into period t + 1 (in terms of consumption good),
respectively, I have the following profit-maximizing conditions for the firm with




























The first and second equation are a familiar investment Euler and wage equa-
tion. The third equation relates the shadow price of capital to the marginal benefit
of investment in capital production. There are a few simplifications I should do
before moving on. First, I substitute equation (2.5) for qt in equation (2.3) to
1There is an alternative interpretation of this model in terms of two-sector production econ-














The condition says that the return on a unit of capital in terms of consumption
good must equal to the marginal product of capital plus the marginal reduction
in adjustment cost next period. If I now use equation (2.2) and (2.5) to find the





Note that, from equation (2.7), to get the desired valued of capital in the next
period, I must invest less than that value (investment is measured in terms of
consumption good and φ ∈ [0, 1]). Recall that capital fully depreciates every pe-
riod, thus the result comes from the fact that investment in this period contributes
positively to both capital formation (Kt+1) and to the appraisal value of capital
(qt). If φ = 1, I have no adjustment cost and investment equals to the value of
desired capital (qt = 1).
2.2.2 Populations
Following Sand and Razin [2007], I assume that immigrants are naturalized in one
period thus gaining citizenship in the next period. All immigrants are young. I let
µt ∈ [0, 1] denote the inflow of migrants as a proportion of the current native-born
young population. I let Nt denote the size of native young population in period t,
thus the number of immigrants is µtNt. Native-born has a population growth rate
of n ∈ [−1, 1] while the immigrant’s growth rate is m ∈ [−1, 1]. I assume n < m,
so the immigrants’ entrance to the economy will lift national population growth
rate. According to these descriptions, the demographic dynamics is described by
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the following equation
Nt = (1 + n)Nt−1 + µt−1(1 +m)Nt−1
= nt−1Nt−1 (2.8)
where nt−1 = 1+n+µt−1(1+m) be the gross population growth rate at time t−1.
I assume that both native and immigrants supply their unit of labor inelas-
tically. However, as for their contribution to the labor force, immigrants are a
perfect substitute for native-born workers with lower productivity. I capture this
differential productivity between the two types of labor in a linear fashion with a
parameter γ ∈ (0, 1].2 Given this setup, the aggregate labor supply is given by
Lst = (1 + γµt)Nt, (2.9)
which follows from the assumption that every and only young individual works,
including immigrants. Note that, (1 + µt)Nt is the size of the young consumer in
the period t, while Lst is the size of the labor force. For brevity of notation, I let
γi =
 1 , i = Nγ , i = M
where i indexes either native-born (N) or immigrant (M ) status. It is straightfor-
ward to see that the wage receives for each i is
wit = γ
iwt (2.10)
where wt is given in equation (2.4). Furthermore, the children of the immigrants
will be part of the citizens, and hence their labor will be as productive as those
of the native born. This is implicitly embedded in the structure of population
dynamics in equation (2.8). So only the newly arrived immigrants have lower
productivity of labor than that of the native-born labor.
2Arguably, imperfect substitution could be also be considered via a production function with
skill complementarity. However, to keep the model tractable, I refrain from doing so. I refer
interested readers to the work by Casarico and Devillanova [2003].
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2.2.3 Preferences
Immigrants and native-born citizens have identical preference. Each individual
lives for two periods in an overlapping manner. Individuals consume consump-
tion good in both periods, while supply inelastically his unit labor when young.
Therefore, in retirement year, old individual will only consume his saving. I as-
sume no bequest motives between generations.3 Each individual in period t has














t ) + β ln(c
o
t+1).
Individuals from each generation will maximize their respective utility given in
equation (2.11) subject to budget constraints



















wit. Only the young saves in
the economy, while the old dissaves his savings for old period’s consumption. I
substitute these expressions back into the utility functions in (2.11) to find each
generation’s indirect utility function in period t as
V o,it (wt−1, Rt) = ln(w
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V y,it (wt, Rt+1) = (1 + β) ln(w
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I want to point out here that savings of immigrants are smaller than that of the
native-born by the fraction γ. However, if there is a probability of returning home,
3Abel [2001] shows that bequest will not change the theoretical conclusion of stock market
meltdown. So I disregard bequest motives to focus directly at the core issue of interest.
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the result could be different, as demonstrated in Galor and Stark [1990]. They
show that, with homogeneous labor force, positive probability of returning home
will induce immigrants to save more. I do not have that feature in the model.
2.2.4 Economic Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the savings of the young finance the capital for the next period:
St = qtKt+1
where St is the aggregate saving of the young in the economy (including migrants).
Note that the next period’s level of capital is fully determined in this period when
the saving decision is made. I can divide the aggregate saving of the young into





t = (1 + γµt)Nts
N
t
where the latter equality follows from using equation (2.10) in the saving function.
Hence, the equilibrium condition above can be rewritten as
(1 + γµt)Nts
N
t = qtKt+1. (2.13)







, instead of their aggregate counterparts.4 Labor market clearing implies





. Using equation (2.7), which




has slight peculiarity. At the end of period t, capital per investor
(young of period t) is in fact Kt+1Nt , though at the dawn light of period t + 1, capital per native
worker is kt+1. The choice then boils down to the importance of each ratio in the analysis. I






φβ(1− α)(1 + γµt)1−αkαt
1 + β
. (2.14)
I can now use this equation to solve the model for all of the variables. First, I use












Next, I use of the transformed equation of the rate of return for capital in (2.6)
and again substitute in investment per native citizen (2.14) and the labor supply













By observation of equation (2.15) and (2.16), I can summarize impact of immigra-
tion on the asset price and rate of return in the following proposition.
Proposition 8. For φ ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 0, increasing the rate of migration, µt,
will increase the price of capital, qt, and rate of return on capital, Rt.
For the shadow price of capital, the positive effect of immigration feeds through
investment-saving channel. Higher immigration leads to higher supply of loanable
funds as well as higher demand for it. These two forces increase equilibrium level
of investment and push up the price of capital. As for the return on savings, a rise
in the rate of migration will induce higher returns on the capital for the holder
of already-existing capital. Immigration provides benefits through two channels.
First channel is to increase the marginal product of capital in the production of
consumption good by simply augmenting the labor force. The second channel
is to increase investment in the economy to form a higher capital stock in the
next period. Higher investment uplifts qt directly as well as further increases the
marginal product of Kt in the capital adjustment technology. Together, they allow
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the capital holders in the economy to enjoy higher return on their investment.
However, this increase of the price one must pay to acquire capital in the same
period produces conflicting interest for people who are about to save at time t.
In this period, they would prefer no immigration so the price of capital in period
t would be low, hence they could accumulate more assets. Then as period t + 1
comes, they would prefer as large as possible immigration to drive up the return
of their savings.
I pause here a bit to comment on the stock market meltdown literature as a
consequent of demographic shift. In this economy, labor flows across border will
dampen any effect of the stock market doomsday due to the aging demography. In
addition to the expansion of the tax base to sustain the current PAYGO pension
system, this channel provides an additional benefit of immigration to the retirees.
Returning to the analysis, I substitute equation (2.14) into the capital technol-










Here the direction of response of kt+1 to the policy variable µt is unclear. On the
one hand, under γ > 0, immigrants always bring some positive contribution to
the production through saving and investment. So higher rate of immigration will
consequently lead to higher capital going in the next period. On the other hand,
the actual capital per capita in the next period depends on the size of population in
that period. Depending on how fast immigrants procreate, this effect will adversely
affect the level of capital per labor in period t + 1 (recall that gross population
growth is denoted by nt = 1 + n+ µt(1 +m)).
Since I have assumed log additive preferences, the convenient form of endoge-
neous variables given in equation (2.15) to (2.17) is in log form. Therefore, I take
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log of these equations, and utilize the population dynamics from equation (2.8) to
write Kt+1 in per native form, and I have the following expressions





− φ lnφ (2.18)













In addition to Rt, I will need to know the behavior of Rt+1 in response to today’s
variables. So I take equation (2.16) and forward it one period. Then I take log of
the resulting equation, and substitute in the expressions for ln qt and ln kt+1 to get

















As in Proposition 8, Rt+1 positively respond to change in µt+1. As for the response
of Rt+1 to µt, the result seems a little ambiguous. However, under careful anal-
ysis, the equation reveals that Rt+1 responds positively to µt. The result follows
from the parameter restrictions within setup of the model (both production and
demographic parameters).
Corollary 9. Rt+1 is increasing in period t choice of immigration quotas, µt.
I delegate the proof to the appendix. This corollary shows that returns on
investment will continue to move beneficially as a response past level of immi-
gration. Basic intuition dictates that more immigrants would increase saving and
hence would further depress the return on savings earned in the next period (by
pushing up the price of capital this period relative to the next). However, after
each population grows according to their rates, higher population growth rate of
immigrants will generate more workers and more demand for assets (also more
saving and investment). This raises the return on saving in the next period.
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Figure 2.5: The timing in the deterministic model.
2.2.5 Political Equilibrium
In this section, I study the nature of political equilibrium in this economy. The
timing in the economy is given in Figure 2.5. Voters vote at the beginning of the
period, winning policies are implemented, and payoffs are realized. The political
process repeats.
The first step in the analysis is to derive completely the indirect utility functions
for the contemporaneous generations as a function of policy and state variables.
Using the already convenient form of endogeneous variables given in equation (2.18)
to (2.21) and the raw indirect utility functions derived in equation (2.12), I have





+ lnwt−1 − ln qt−1 +Bo (2.22)
V yt (µt, µt+1, kt) = (1 + β(1− φ(1− α)))α ln kt + β(1− α) [lnnt + ln(1 + γµt+1)]
−((1 + β)α + β(1− α)(1− αφ)) ln(1 + γµt) +By (2.23)
where Bj for j ∈ {y, o} are constant for individual’s indirect utility. These con-
































The political economic equilibrium uses the subgame-perfect Markov concept
(also known as Markov-perfect). The following definition defines this concept for-
mally in the context of the model.
Definition 10. The policy function µt = M (µt−1, kt) where M : [0, 1] × R+ →
[0, 1] is the decision rule for migration level, constitutes a Subgame Perfect Markov
Political Equilibrium (SPME) if it satisfies
M(µt−1, kt) = arg max
µt∈[0,1]
V dt (µt,M(µt, kt+1), kt)









where nt = 1 + n+ µt(1 +m) and d ∈ {y, o} is the identity of the decisive voter.
For a cleaner notation, I will denote the evolution of capital per native worker
with kt+1 = K(µt, kt). Since the indirect utility functions in equation (2.22) -
(2.23) have already incorporated in the constraint of kt+1, I can simply continue
with characterizing the SPME with the derived equations. Drawing attention now
to the definition, I note that it requires the SPME to be optimal given that the
decisive voter takes into account that the policy decision rule will be applied in
the next period.
The ratio of old versus young voter in period t + 1 is given by the following
expression (equation (13) in Sand and Razin [2007])
vt+1 = v(µt) =
1 + µt
1 + n+ µt(1 +m)
. (2.24)
In this simplistic setup, I think of this ratio, v(µt), as the old dependency ratio of
the economy. This ratio, along with relative magnitude of the underlying demo-
graphic parameters, will help determine the identity of the decisive voter in the
next period as a function of µt. I assume the tie breaker goes to the old voter, that
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is, if vt+1 ≥ 1, the old is the decisive median voter. Recall that I always assume
n < m. Accordingly, if both m,n > 0, then vs+1 < 1 for all µs ∈ [0, 1] and for all
s ≥ t. On the other hand if m,n < 0 then vs+1 > 1 for all µs ∈ [0, 1] and for all
s ≥ t. An interesting case is when n < 0 < m, which has a potential of producing
a switching demographic structures. Now I look at the political equilibrium.
Proposition 11. The policy decision rule that constitutes a Subgame-perfect
Markov Political Equilibrium is described by
M(µt−1, kt) =

1 , if v(µt−1) ≥ 1






, if v(µt−1) < 1 , γ < γ, and Ψ(µ∗) > 1
0 , if v(µt−1) < 1 , γ ≥ γ
(2.25)
where the parameters µ∗, γ and Ψ(µ) are defined in the appendix and capital evolves
according to the strategy specified above,
kt+1 = K(kt,M(µt−1, kt)).
Again I delegate the proof to appendix. The evolution of the capital is sim-
ply the equation in Definition 10 with policy rule substituted in for µt (depicted
in Figure 2.6). Similar to the line of literatures using SPME with overlapping-
generations model (for example, see Hassler [2003]), I have the equilibrium with
the behavior that the current period’s decisive voter tries to influence the identity
of the next period’s decisive voter. This result reflects the preference of the young
individuals. Sure, they would like to choose their optimum level of migration rate
(that is max {0, µ∗}), where µ∗ comes from maximizing the young’s indirect utility.
But if such a choice will take away the privilege of being the decisive voter in the
next period, they may compromise for a different level of migration rate (as close
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as possible to their preferred policy choice) that will guarantee themselves a say in
the next period. Such a strategic behavior will arise or not depends on the relative
distance from µ∗ to 1, and from µ∗ to − n
m
. If µ∗ is close enough to 1, the young
in this period will choose his optimal µ∗, knowing that next period’s median voter
will be young and they will also choose µ∗. Since µ∗ is relatively closer to 1 (the
current period’s young’s preferred level of next period’s rate of immigration), the
current young will not be hurt as much by giving up the decisive role to the next
generation while getting to determine the policy at their ideal point in the current
period. However, if µ∗ is close to − n
m
, in the viewpoint of the young generation,
it is worth sacrificing a little today (by choosing − n
m
instead of µ∗) to gain a lot
tomorrow (by placing their generation as the decisive voter in the next period).
The function Ψ(µ) captures these relative tradeoffs.
The parameter γ tells me the threshold where some positive immigration is
desirable. Above the threshold, the young in this period are better-off forbidding
immigration altogether. The result suggests that for the young generation of a
high productivity country, low-skilled immigrant may make them better-off due to
less competition.
Corollary 12. Depending on the parameters of population growth rates, there are
three possible equilibrium paths:
1. For 0 < n, the young individuals form the majority in all periods and the
immigration rate will be max{0, µ∗} < 1.
2. For n+m < 0, the old individuals form form majority in all periods and the
immigration rate is always 1.
3. For n < 0 < n + m, the old and young individuals take turn to form the
majority in the economy. Consequently, there would be less than a unit mi-
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gration rate when young individuals form the majority and a unit migration
rate when old individuals form the majority. The economy cycle through
different immigration policies.
It is quite natural to expect three possible equilibrium paths to emerge, given
the description of the demographic structure before Proposition 11. When 0 < n,
the young generation always forms the majority. Depending on the parameter
values, the young will either prefer 0 or the level of migration equals to µ∗ < 1.
There is no game to play here. Similarly, for n+m < 0, the old generation forms
the majority, hence they always open the economy to migration, trying to boost
the return on their savings. Consequently, the immigration rate equals to one.
Again, there is no demographic game here, so the result is straightforward. When
n < 0 < n+m, strategic behavior of the young causes switching between old and
young as the decisive voter. Above SPME applies directly to this case when there
is a possible game among the two co-existing generations.
I end this section with a corollary linking the political equilibrium in Proposi-
tion 11 to the behavior of asset price in Proposition 8, see accompanying Figure
2.6.
Corollary 13. The asset price in period t, qt, and the return on saving in period
t, Rt, will be higher when the old cohort forms the majority than when young forms
the majority.
This result requires no proof as it is fairly self-evident. Upon inspection, qt rises
with immigration quota, which will be higher when old cohort has the majority
than when young has the majority.
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Figure 2.6: ln(q¯), ln(qy), and ln(qo) is the natural log level of asset prices in
when there is no immigration, the young forms majority, and the
old forms majority, respectively.
2.3 Economy under Uncertainty
Often, the consideration of factor flow is a balance with between optimal risk and
return management. My aim now is capture this with some alterations in the
model, allowing some uncertainty in the model. Namely, I use a random immi-
grant’s growth rate to capture the idea that their growth rate cannot be predicted
with precision. I also introduce stochastic total factor productivity (TFP) into the
production function of the consumption good. Nonetheless, this last addition to
the model will not produce significantly different result to having just the uncer-
tain population growth. Thus this section can be viewed as providing a robustness
check for my earlier results.
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2.3.1 Production
To avoid repetition, I will try to restate only the parts of the model with alterations.
Production now takes the form





where the TFP of the model is a random variable. I will not specify now the
stochastic form that At might follow, as such information is not necessary for the
result. The capital adjustment technology takes the same form as in equation (2.2),
hence it will induce the same price of capital as in equation (2.5). The marginal
returns to labor and capital take similar form only with the TFP floating around

















where I have already substitute in for qt in the expression for Rt. It will also be





Other population structures are no different from above, except that I allow for a
random population growth rate of immigrants. That is, I assume mt ∼ [−1, 1] for
every t > 0 with its mean greater than the population growth rate of the natives
(i.e. Et−1mt > n). I also assume they are independent over time of any lagged
or forward values. I still let µt ∈ [0, 1] be the proportion of immigrant to native
workers. Hence expected population size in period t given the immigration level
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in period t− 1 is5
Et−1Nt = (1 + n+ µt−1(1 + Et−1mt−1))Nt−1
where the symbol Et−1 denotes expectation conditional on the information set at
time t−1. As before, all entering immigrants are young, and they supply their unit
labor inelastically. Since there is a productivity difference, I continue to denote
the two wages with one notation wit as described before equation (2.10).
2.3.3 Preference
Ideally, it would be desirable to have a model that captures the trade off between
risks and returns with a parameter like the degree of risk aversion. However, such a
model proves difficult to work with for closed-form structures that I want. In order
to continue with my analysis, I will have to forego more exotic utility functions and
settle for an easier log preference that is more manageable. Both cohorts, young
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where i ∈ {m,n} denotes individual’s immigration status. The budget constraints
for consumers look similar to the deterministic case, only now it must hold almost
surely. Under log preference, young’s decision to save is independent of any future
returns it might earn. So the optimal profile of consumption and saving looks like
what I have presented before, which I can substitute in the expected utilities above
to find relevant expected indirect utilities.




I will briefly describe the steps taken to derive analytical expressions here, as de-
tails are similar to the deterministic setup. In equilibrium, the capital going into
production next period is financed solely from the savings of the young (since the
young cohort is the only saver, while the old cohort only dissaves), so the equilib-
rium condition is St = qtKt+1. With the help of equation (2.26), market clearing
condition in the labor market (Lt = (1 + γµt)Nt), and the population dynamics, I
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to find the expression for aggregate investment. Having found the expression for
It, I am now ready to find the important equations for the endogeneous variables.
These are given as follows,

































t (1 + γµt)
φ(1−α)
1 + n+ µt(1 +mt)
.
I now proceed by taking natural log of these expressions and put them in the
expected indirect utility functions to facilitate political economic analysis.
2.3.5 Political Equilibrium
When studying the political equilibrium under uncertainty, the timing of the model
is more important than ever before. It ultimately decides what information the
agents in the economy possess when evaluating their choices. The timeline of the
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Figure 2.7: The timing of the model with uncertainty.
model I have in mind is illustrated in Figure 2.7. I want the voting in the model
to take place in every period before the uncertainty is resolved. Another way of
thinking about this is to imagine the young agent born at the dawn of period t.
When political process takes place (possibly right after birth of the youngsters!),
both cohorts are merely equipped with information set from period t−1, as nothing
new in period t has been revealed yet.6 Thus at the point where political deci-
sions are made, people take expected value of their indirect utilities conditional
on information in period t− 1.7 After the policy is determined, nature reveals the
uncertain values, then labor flows, and consumptions are realized.
The expressions for the expected indirect utilities of the representative agent
of each cohort, ignoring unimportant constants, are given below:
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6Doing so, I stay inline with the literature where information at time t contains information
about all variables in time t.
7I can do this in two ways. One by brute assumption that agents take expected indirect utility
conditional on information set time t− 1 during political process, Et−1(·). Another is to assume
that agents take expect value of expected indirect utility of period t, or Et−1(Et(·)), which leads
to the same conclusion.
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Note that no cohort needs a superscript i ∈ {m,n}, as only the young native at the
beginning of the period gets to vote, and the part of the preference that matters
for the old matches for both native and previously-migrated old.
I want to find the ideal immigration policy of the young as I have done in the
proof of Proposition 11. Differentiating the young’s expected indirect utility with
respect to µt holding future variables constant yields the first order condition
Et−1
{
(1 + γµ̂)(1 +m)
1 + n+ µ̂(1 +m)
}
=
γ (β + α [1− (1− α)βφ])
β(1− α) , (2.28)
which implicitly defines the immigration bliss point of the young cohort, µ̂. I can
learn a little bit more about µ̂ with a help of Jensen’s inequality. I define the
following quantity: let µ∗ be the risk-neutral value to the preferred policy of the
young. With a little abuse of notation, µ∗ also represents the ideal immigration
policy for the young cohort under deterministic set up, if Et−1mt = m,∀t > 0,
where m is the deterministic population growth rate of the immigrants. I have the
following lemma.
Lemma 14. The young prefers lower level of immigration when there is uncer-
tainty about its future growth rate, µ̂ 6 µ∗.
Proof is provided in the appendix. The lemma is actually quite straightfor-
ward if one knows a little bit of choice theory under uncertainty. By admitting
immigrants, the young generates uncertain population growth rate against them-
selves. Being a risk-averse individual, this lowers his payoff. So there is a premium
associated with his preferred policy level.
Beliefs. I will use the same equilibrium concept as defined above in the deter-
ministic setup (see Definition 10). However, before I can actually characterize the
equilibrium, there is one issue that I must deal with. It is clear that, irrespective
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of the uncertainty, the old cohort always prefers maximal openness of the economy
to migration. As for the young, the preference is no longer that clear, because he
still has the option of acting strategically. Since the young cannot be sure of his
influence of the identity of the decisive voter next period (due to uncertain popu-
lation growth rate), his expectation (or belief) about the identity of future decisive
voter plays a role. The young’s belief must be rational, in a sense that it conforms
with the logic and parameters of the model. For example, it is implausible for the
young to believe that µt = 1 will still induce themselves as the majority old in
the next period, or µt = 0 will place the identity of future median voter with the
future young (recall that strategic interaction only happens with n < 0).
Formally, the young in period t will expect themselves to be the majority old
in period t+ 1 if
(1 + µt)Nt > (1 + n+ µt(1 + Et−1mt)Nt, or
−n > µtEt−1mt
and if Et−1mt > 0 > n, it leads the condition that −nEt−1mt > µt. I follow Hassler et.
al. [2003] in restricting the belief to be monotonic. So the belief of the young can




. That is, the choice of any µt 6 ζ
will induce the young to believe that they will be the future majority when they
are old, v(µt) > 1, and choose µt+1 = 1.
With all the pieces together, I am ready to state the main proposition charac-
terizing the political economic equilibrium in the model with uncertainty.




, there is a
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Subgame-perfect Markov Political Equilibrium with the following policy rule
M(µt−1, kt) =

1 , if v(µt−1) ≥ 1
µ̂ , if v(µt−1) < 1 , and Ψ̂(µ̂, ζ) 6 1
max {0,min {µ̂, ζ}} , if v(µt−1) < 1 , and Ψ̂(µ̂, ζ) > 1
where the parameters µ̂ is defined from equation (2.28) and the function Ψ̂(µ̂, ζ) is
defined in the appendix. Capital evolves according to the strategy specified above in
equation (2.27),
kt+1 = K(kt,M(µt−1, kt)).
The proof is provided in the appendix. The proposition looks similar to the
one presented before in the deterministic case. Depending on the relative distance
between the young’s belief and the young’s bliss point, if the decisive voter rep-
resents the young generation, he may have an incentive to act strategically. That
is by choosing a suboptimal level of migration to his preference today, in order to
make sure that he could pick the policy he wants tomorrow. Note that, the only
uncertainty that matters for my result here is the uncertain population growth
of the immigrants. It makes the identity of the decisive voter in the future pe-
riod uncertain, and hence reduces the preferred level of immigration for the young
cohort.
Let me assume a little further about the stochastic nature of this model. Let
the total factor productivity (TFP) evolves according to a geometric random walk
process. That is,
lnAt = lnAt−1 + εA,t.
Under this process, I can derive the following stochastic processes for the underly-
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ing state variables in the model





+ [1− (1− α)φ] ln k̂t + φ(1− α) ln (1 + γµt) (2.29)
− ln (1 + n+ µt(1 +mt))− 1
1− αεA,t+1
ln qt = [1− φ(1− α)] ln qt−1 + (1− α)(1− φ) [ln (1 + γµt)− ln (1 + γµt−1)]







is the capital per effective native worker. The following
corollary follows readily from equation (2.30) and Proposition 15. Note that I only
make additional assumption about the stochastic evolution of TFP for elegant and
simplified expressions above. So the validity of the following corollary does not
hinge on this assumption at all.
Corollary 16. The asset price, qt, will be higher when the old forms majority than
when the young forms majority in the economy.
The proof is evident in equation (2.30). To complete the reasoning, I substitute
in M(µt−1, kt) for µt. Just like the earlier analysis in the deterministic case, asset
prices responds positively to the policy variable. Even with uncertainty, it does not
stop the dwellers in the economy to try utilizing the political power for their gains.
Although growth rate of immigrant is uncertain, today’s choice of migration quotas
has a definite and positive impact on the asset valuation. Furthermore, equation
(2.30) tells me that the past choice of immigration rate affects the asset prices in
two ways: negatively through direct impact and positively through the population
growth rate. It can be shown that under the parameter restrictions in the model,
the net effect of past immigration rate is a positive one.
Lemma 17. Under geometric random work technological process assumption, if
1 +mt−1 > γ(1 + n), then higher immigration in the previous period raises the the
current period’s asset price.
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To see why this is true, differentiate equation (2.30) with respect to µt−1, hold-
ing everything else constant. Since it is assumed in the Lemma that 1 + mt−1 >
γ(1 + n) and γ ∈ [0, 1], then asset prices will be higher this period with higher
µt−1.
2.4 Empirical Epilogue
In this section, I briefly review existing empirical evidences available that are
related to this chapter. Although some works have been done on immigration
impact on returns to capital (Simon [1999]), no works have been done thus far
on asset prices. This leaves room for an empirical contribution. In addition,
most works on the economic effect immigration pay enormous attention to today’s
impact of today’s level of immigrants. As my intertemporal approach suggests,
the impact of immigration today could last for must longer than just their period
of entrance. In a pilot study funded by the National Research Council [1997], it
projects that if immigration continues as they did in 1995, two third of population
growth in the U.S. in 2050 would come from immigrants. And immigration today
is actually higher than the level in 1995 (both in absolute number of immigrants
and in relative to the U.S. population size). So future impact from the current
immigration policy should be of an importance.
In terms of immigrants’ impact on the value of assets, Albert Saiz [2007] finds
that an influx of immigrants at 1% of a city population is associated with 1%
increase in rental and house prices in the city. He argues that this impact is
much larger than what the literature found in labor markets. He concludes that
homeowners benefit from higher housing prices in net.
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The last piece of empirical finding that I would refer to is Brooks [2006]. In that
paper, Robin Brooks attempts to find a conclusive evidence regarding demography
change and asset prices. While theoretical works conclude that asset prices will
likely fall as babyboomers retire, empirical findings reach much less consensus.
Brooks uses a comprehensive data set spanning 16 countries, some covering over
a century. Instead of relying on a specific measure of demographic ratio, Brooks’
empirical specification allows for the entire demographic distribution to enter the
regressions. He finds that, in equity-based economy, such as Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S., asset prices respond positively to aging
population. That means, as the importance of the old-age group rises, so do the
asset prices. Theoretical prediction of falling asset prices as babyboomers retire
instead conform with the data from bank-based economies, which raises a question
on its validity. Being a bank-based economy, it is unclear whether the demographic
variables drive such trends.
All in all, I can say that there is some empirical supports to the findings in
this chapter, albeit not directly. Nonetheless, since each period in these theo-
retical models corresponds to over 20 years (for my model, I would say around
25-30 years), any precise empirical relationship will be difficult to identify as many
things happen along those times. For example, stock market in the U.S. booms
throughout the 1990’s, and so is the rising ratio of babyboomers to the rest of the
population. It will be dubious to conclude a causal relationship from babyboomers
to stock market, neglecting all other technological advancement during these times.
Any future work that aims to link babyboomers and stock market must provide a
convincing argument of why the explanation should come from demographic vari-
ables and not from others. In addition, it will be important to separate out any
endogeneous effect on policy variable from the babyboom cohort. As depicted in
68
Immigration and Asset Prices 
How Different Cohorts Can Benefit 
 















Source: Author's calculation using information from UN Population Division
 



















St = qt Kt+1 
Figure 2.8: Political median (median age of population 18 and over).
Figure 2.8, the age of the median voter is growing through this demographic shift.
Hence future analyses must not only focus on an increase in old-age ratio, but also
an increase in the political pressure that comes with this transition.
2.5 Conclusion
The objectives of my study are twofold. First, I try to understand the relationship
between immigration and asset prices. Secondly, I ask how will different cohorts
harness the benefits through political interactions. I start with an overlapping-
generations model of Diamond’s type (Diamond [1965]), which is extended in Abel
[2003].I further include the demographic structure that allows for different popula-
tion growth rates between native-born citizens and immigrants, and also a political
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choice of immigration quota, following Sand and Razin [2007]. In the model, eco-
nomic factors interact through the production function with an adjustment cost
of capital similar to Hayashi [1982] and Basu [1987]. This generates a Tobin’s q
that I interpret as reflecting the behavior of asset prices. After looking at the
economic equilibrium, I consider political economic equilibrium, using Subgame-
perfect Markov Political Economic Equilibrium (SMPE), similarly used and defined
in Krussell and Rios-Rull [1996], Hassler et. al. [2003], and Sand and Razin [2007].
The crux of my results are the following.
Asset prices respond positively to immigration in the same period . They also
respond positively to the past level of immigration, through higher population
growth. By increasing immigration, this pushes for higher investment-saving, thus
raising the price of capital by increasing the marginal contribution of each invest-
ment to capital adjustment technology. The return to capital could end up much
higher than previously thought in Berry and Soligo [1969], and Simon [1999]. So
even without any taxes paid, the immigrants’ contribution to production, their
savings, and the savings and the contributions of their future offsprings can create
a favorable movement in asset prices in an economy with a large set of capital hold-
ers. With the economy under uncertainty, the core results of my chapter remain
fairly robust (only now in expected terms, not absolute). However, uncertainty
has a cost to risk-averse individuals. Consequently, the utility-maximizing level of
immigration quota is smaller when the population growth rate of the immigrants
is uncertain compare to that in the deterministic case.
In all settings, asset prices will be higher when the old cohort forms the ma-
jority than when the young cohort forms the majority. In addition, the young
generation may have strategic motive while voting (trying to influence the identity
70
of next period’s decisive voter), and the old simply prefers full openness to im-
migration. However, whether the young acts strategically or not depends, among
other things, on relative position of the ideal policy choice and strategic choice.
The young cohort will compare costs and benefits between the two schemes and
will act according to how the payoffs dictate. The economy may cycle through
opening and closing to labor flows because of this strategic behavior.
One important implication from my study shows that asset prices, captured
by Tobin’s q, may actually rise in response to aging demography. Since the baby-
boomers are a large cohort, they form a strong political clout. Knowing that if
they just wait and do nothing, their retirement funds may be jeopardized, baby-
boomers will look to outside for buyers and will exert political influence to ensure
that their lifetime investment does not plunge in values just when they need it
the most. Earlier works in this line ignore completely the powerful political power
that lies in the hand of the babyboomers.
In sum, I redirect the attention to a newer channel of analysis. I argue that
debates on immigration should extend beyond labor market and fiscal effects. Im-
migration has potential valuation effect, in terms of asset prices. The future pursuit
of this reasoning should dig deeper into empirical works to show how much ”po-
tential” there is. Some academic works have already taken those routes, namely
Saiz [2003, 2007], and Lach [2007]. I would wish to follow down such a path to
throw further lights on the issue.
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CHAPTER 3
ARE WE THERE YET? ESCAPING POVERTY TRAP WITH
REDISTRIBUTION
3.1 Introduction
A discourse on development can never be complete without mentioning the ”vi-
cious cycle of poverty.” Development economists have worked tirelessly to uncover
many ”poverty traps” that create such vicious mechanism on the world’s poor.
We know now that an emergence of poverty traps require two necessary ingredi-
ents: (i) underlying heterogeneity (that is, different initial conditions) and, (ii) a
self-reinforcing mechanisms that perpetuate poverty overtime. In particular, as
Azariadis and Stachurski [2005] puts it:
”... the mechanisms which reinforce poverty may occur at any scale
of social and spatial aggregation, from individuals to families, com-
munities, regions, and countries. Traps can arise not just across geo-
graphical location... but also within dispersed collections of individuals
affiliated by ethnicity, religious beliefs or clan.”
Thus, the existence of poverty traps poses a major obstacle and challenge for
all development economists and practitioners. For a comprehensive survey of the
literatures on poverty traps, I refer the readers to Azariadis and Stachurski [2005].
Matsuyama [2005] provides a brief, yet insightful introduction to the topic.
Consider a standard poverty trap model with one state variable summarizing
each individual’s wealth. Conventional wisdom from the literatures tells us that
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egalitarian redistribution may end up harming the economy. If the initial condi-
tions are such that the economy’s average wealth falls short of the threshold, equal
distribution means every member of the economy will be below the threshold, and
hence ”trapped” in an undesirable equilibrium. Accordingly, the best one-shot
redistribution policy for any poor country is to push as many dynasties as possible
pass the threshold, which in turn, is equivalent to minimizing the headcount ratio
(see Basu [1997] pp. 60-61). This may even entail taxing the poorer quarter and
giving the proceeds to the richer households, in order to minimize any transfer of
wealth. These findings are rather discouraging and disturbing for poorer economies
who started with less than others.
The objective of this chapter is not to unearth a new source of poverty trap
previously overlooked by the literatures. I aim to address two simple, but subtle,
questions: Can redistribution help all the poor households escape the poverty
traps? And if so, will the redistribution policy survives the political process to
deliver its promise? Clearly, before any light can be thrown on the second question,
I must answer the first question.
As I will show in this chapter that, there is a redistribution scheme that can be
used as an escape out of the poverty trap. To elucidate on this point, I focus on a
particular model, initially studied in Galor and Zeira [1993]. Although my result
on redistribution could straightforwardly be generalized, there are two reasons
why I choose to restrict myself in this way. First, with a specific model of poverty
traps, I can discuss comparative static exercises and implications using the model’s
structural parameters. Much more and sharper insights can be drawn from the
study that way. The second reason pertains to the second question I want to
address. Specific model allows me to write down a closed-form system, in which I
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could further investigate the political preference of individuals in the economy.
A theoretical work by Galor and Zeira [1993] is one of the most eminent and
seminal accounts of poverty traps. In this influential paper, the authors have
demonstrated the importance of initial distribution to macroeconomic outcomes.
They focus on how income distribution affect the long-run performance of an econ-
omy through investment decisions in human-capital. In the presence of capital
market imperfections and indivisible cost to human-capital, the model exhibits
multiple steady states, one is preferable to the other. Regrettably, as discussed
above, equal distribution does not equal good equilibrium. Non-unique steady
state implies that the initial level of wealth will eventually determine who ends up
where. The long-run performance of a country is ”affected by the initial distribu-
tion of wealth, or more specifically by the percentage of individuals who inherit a
large enough wealth to enable them to invest in human capital (Galor and Zeira
[1993], p. 51).”
Using the framework of Galor and Zeira, I carefully crafted a scheme of taxes
and transfers as an escape from the poverty trap. In plain words, my method is as
follows. First, I push a dynasty pass the poverty threshold, and then I patiently
wait for the wealth accumulation for both the poor and the rich households. Once
sufficient amount of wealth is accumulated in the economy, I again push another
dynasty over the threshold. By recognizing the usefulness of the economic growth,
I repeat the process until every dynasty is above the poverty trap. This result is
only possible in dynamic economy which is evolving all the time.
I further show that this redistribution scheme will achieve the result of economic
transformation in finite time, not just in its limit. Since there are a finite number
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of dynasties within the model1, my result guarantees that everyone will be on the
path to higher steady-state in finite number of periods. Hence I do not need to
appeal to any property that may emerge as the model moves ad infinitum. This
provides a support to the idea that gradual transformation can achieve superior
economic outcome than the ”big-bang” style. However, it should be emphasized
that, despite this possibility of an escape out of the poverty trap, poverty tends to
be long-lasting2.
Once I have these results in hands, I move on to address the issue of its political
implementation. Unfortunately, the result for this part is negative. The poor
and unskilled dynasties are the main beneficiaries of the policy. As the economy
grows richer, the skilled dynasties will collectively form a stronger political bloc,
and eventually the redistribution scheme will be stopped. This struggle gives us
a glimpse of how inequality may slowdown poverty reduction effort, though not
necessarily growth. As an economy transits into the middle income group, it may
appear more difficult to reduce poverty at the same rate as before. I discuss
implications of this result and also its limitations in the discussion section. I
suggest that this result should raise awareness about redistribution and incentives
of the skilled workers. The policymakers must not rely entirely on redistribution
as the source of income for the poor households.
The question of income distribution and growth occupies the great economic
minds for a long time. Arguably, Kuznets [1955] generates the first wave of interest
of the profession on this issue. Thereafter, the question breaks into two strains.
One line continues to ask the question true to the original inquiry: do growth and
1Original Galor and Zeira [1993]’s formulation uses a continuum of dynasties, while I use finite
number of dynasties. This tweaking in the original setup changes nothing of the original work. I
could also take a continuum of households and divide them in uniform masses, and proceed with
the same analysis. I thank Joseph Zeira for pointing this out to me.
2I thank Oded Galor for pointing this out.
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level of national income determine the distribution of income? However, empirical
support for this hypothesis has been mixed. For a review of this line of literature,
I refer the reader to chapter 3 in Fields [2001].
Another line of literature asks the question in the reverse direction: how does
income distribution affect the economy’s ability to grow? Earlier theoretical anal-
yses such as Loury [1981] generate an ergodic process converging to a unique
income distribution regardless of initial distribution. Two theoretical papers bring
a different light to this economic issue, Galor and Zeira [1993], and Banerjee and
Newman [1993]. In contrast to earlier works, the models in these two papers
exhibit multiple steady states, giving rise to a non-ergodic process (that means,
initial condition matters for convergence). Although Banerjee and Newman also
ask about initial distribution of income on economic performance, their interests
shift more towards institutional change and occupational choice. Their conclusion,
nonetheless, remains similar to Galor-Zeira: people with initially higher wealth
will tend to choose more profitable occupation and be better off. So in a way, both
of these models tell a story of how the economy will converge to heterogeneity not
homogeneity in the long run, in the presence of credit constraints. A similar story
is fleshed out in Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa [1999] using the ”new growth
theory” framework. Lastly, it is worth mentioning another literature studying the
linkage from inequality to growth from a political economic perspective. Alesina
and Rodrick [1994] elegantly demonstrates that high inequality leads to more re-
distributive policy and thus lower growth, because the policy discourages capital
accumulation.
Danny Quah [1996] discusses some methodologies and works that have at-
tempted to address this ”twin-peak” limit in income distribution convergence.
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Empirically, Quah [1997] and Jones [1997] document such tendency for the world
income distribution to converge to a bi-modal limit. Evidence in Bourguignon and
Morrison [2002] also bolsters the points about worsening inequality, and possibly a
convergence to a bimodal distribution of income. In contrast, recent contribution
by Sala-i-Martin [2006] shows that the world is converging, not diverging. He uses
evidence from micro-level data as well as macro level data to reconcile different
outcomes that may arise with different type of data sets. The debate continues,
nonetheless. In the end, it may be impossible for the data and researchers to
distinguish unimodal and bimodal world from one another.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the original setup of
Galor-Zeira model. I choose to present the version of the model as done in Basu
[1997]. However, all interpretations and key elements remain identical to those
done by the original authors. Section 3 delves directly into to the heart of the
chapter, characterizing lump-sum taxes and transfers that will put every individ-
uals on the prosperous path. In section 4, I add political consideration, analyzing
simple political process and show that future still looks bleak. Section 5 discusses
some lessons learned from my exercise and what policymakers should keep in mind.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Galor-Zeira’s Model
To avoid excess repetitions to Galor-Zeira’s original analysis, I will not provide
detailed descriptions of the economic environment here. Interested readers are
referred to the original work for a complete motivation of variables.
The economy is small and open. Time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1, 2, . . .
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There is only one good in the economy, which gets produced by two technologies
requiring either skilled or unskilled labor. One technology uses capital and skilled
labor while the other uses only unskilled labor with a constant marginal product.
These two labor markets generate two different wages, ws and wn for skilled and
unskilled, respectively. Since this is a small-open economy, the interest rate r > 0
on saving is taken as exogeneous. The capital market is imperfect in the sense that
individuals can borrow at i > r > 0 while firms borrow at r.3 This fixes the level of
capital level in production as well as the two labor wages. Individuals inhabit for
two periods in an overlapping-generation manner. I assume there are L dynasties,
each consists of exactly 1 adult and 1 child. To give positive and measurable
significance to each individual, I assume a finite number of L (in contrast to the
original continuum of measure L). Thus for any period t, the population size is
2L, and there is no population growth.
All individuals are born identical except for the inheritance each receives.
Adults care about bequest they leave behind for the child, b, and the consumption
level, c. Consumption-bequest decisions are made by the adults only, so I can
either assume that individuals consume only in the second period or c already in-
corporates the relevant child’s consumption. I assume all adults have the following
utility function,
u = cαb1−α,
where α ∈ (0, 1). My use of Cobb-Douglas and Galor-Zeira’s original use of the
log utility function are the ensure that a constant fraction α of wealth is consumed
while the rest, 1 − α, is bequeathed. All individuals are endowed with a unit of
3Galor and Zeira attribute this imperfection in capital market to the cost of keeping track
on each borrowers who could default. The firms are a less flexible than individuals, so they face
less credit constraint. Nonetheless, the assumption that firms borrow at r is not necessary yet I
provide it for completeness.
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labor in each period and supply it inelastically (either for school or for work).
The young child receives the bequest in the first period of life and only decide
whether or not to invest in human capital. If she decides to invest, a fixed in-
divisible fee h > 0 is incurred and she foregoes her first period of earning as an
unskilled labor in order to earn ws only in the second period as a skilled adult. If
she decides not to invest, she earns wn as unskilled labor in both periods. Any
inheritance not used can be saved, earning an interest at rate r and any lack of
funds for human-capital investment can be borrowed with interest rate i.
For any level of lifetime resources y, the indirect utility of an adult is simply
V = ey where e = αα(1 − α)1−α. She will consume c = αy and will bequeath
b = (1−α)y. If a young child with inheritance x decides not to invest in education,
her indirect utility and bequest function looks as follows
V n(x) = e [(1 + r)(x+ wn) + wn]
bn(x) = (1− α) [(1 + r)(x+ wn) + wn] .
For an individual who decides to invest in human capital when young, the
functional form of her indirect utility depends on the level of bequest received. If
the initial inheritance exceeds the cost of human capital, x ≥ h, she can earn an
interest r on any left over funds. However, if initial inheritance x is less than cost
of education h, she must borrow extra funds at interest rate i > r to finance her
education. By either mean of finance, she becomes unambiguously skilled in the
next period and earns ws for her labor. The indirect utility and bequest function
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of skilled individuals is given piecewise by
V s(x) =
 e [(1 + r)(x− h) + ws] , if x ≥ he [(1 + i)(x− h) + ws] , if x < h
bs(x) =
 (1− α) [(1 + r) (x− h) + ws] , if x ≥ h(1− α) [(1 + i) (x− h) + ws] , if x < h.
Depending on parameter values, I could have a unique equilibrium where ev-
eryone works as unskilled. These may be of some other theoretical interests,4 but
it of no interest in the context of my objective. To have some individuals acquire
some skills, I must have the reward from education is large enough.5 In algebraic
terms, this means
ws − wn ≥ (1 + r)(wn + h).
In words, investing in human capital must yield benefits that outweigh the oppor-
tunity cost.
Under the assumption above, I can write the wealth dynamics of the economy,
using bequest functions defined above, as
xt+1 = b(xt) =

(1− α) [(xt − h) (1 + r) + ws] , if h ≤ xt
(1− α) [(xt − h) (1 + i) + ws] , if f ≤ xt < h
(1− α) [(1 + r) (xt + wn) + wn] , if xt < f.
To get to the structure of the celebrated long-run bipolar convergence, I further
assume that (1− α) (1 + r) < 1 < (1− α) (1 + i). The dynamic evolution of
4See footnote 12 in Galor and Zeira [1993].
5Incentives matter for effective education, as discussed in Section 5.
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wealth distribution is illustrated in Figure 3.1.6 Notice that, f defines the level
of bequest that satisfies the equation: V n(f) = V s(f). Therefore, any inheritance
higher than f would make payoffs to education attractive to the young child in
this period. But, even if the child receives bequest higher than f , this does not
guarantee that the dynasty will end up as skilled. Unfortunately, although the
bequest is higher than f , it is not high enough because still lower than g. This
dynasty will eventually collapse down to the unskilled steady-state. The reason
is that in the region x ∈ (f, g), each bequest to the next generation shrinks in
size. This continues until the incentive to invest in human capital disappears
entirely. Therefore, this economy has a tendency to converge to a bipolar society
with two distinct groups: rich and poor. How many end up on either end will be
determined by the economy’s initial distribution of wealth (where wealth in the
subsequent periods is reflected in the bequest level).
3.3 The Redistribution Scheme
Before I state and prove my results, it is important to first understand what one-
shot income redistribution can and cannot do. Consider an economy with per
capita wealth higher than g. Under this case, egalitarian distribution will do the
6I list here the parameters of Figure 3.1 for reference
xn =
(1− α)(2 + r)wn
1− (1− α)(1 + r)
f =
(2 + r)wn + (1 + i)h− ws
i− r
g =
(1− α) [h(1 + i)− ws]
(1 + i)(1− α)− 1
xs =
(1− α) [ws − (1 + r)h]
1− (1− α)(1 + r) .



















Figure 3.1: Top diagram shows indirect utilities of skilled (s) and unskilled
(n) with respect to bequest level (x). The diagram directly
below depicts bequest dynamics. There are 3 steady-states:
x¯n, g, and x¯s. Their values are given in footnote 6 in the Chap-
ter.
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job of moving everyone to the higher steady-state. However, if we look at an
opposite economy where per capita wealth is lower than g (which is very likely in
the case of developing countries), egalitarian distribution will pull everyone down
to the lower steady-state. Therefore, if we care about the economy’s long run
performance, measured in terms of wealth, then perfectly equal income distribution
is not necessarily a good thing.7 The best one-shot redistribution policy to fight
poverty for any government in the economy is to minimize the headcount ratio,
using g as the poverty line (see Basu [1997], p. 60-61).8 This may even translate
to taxing the poorer to give to the richer dynasties to get them over the threshold
in an attempt to reduce the size of taxes and transfer. This leads to the conclusion
that rich countries have a chance to fare better than poor countries from the very
beginning. Both Basu [1997] and Galor and Zeira [1993] discuss policy implications
with this model, recommending subsidizing education and lowering capital market
friction (interest differential i − r). None of the policy proposed, however, can
totally eradicate poverty from this model. This is where my work fills in. I ask
whether or not there is a way to entirely eradicate poverty within this model
without external ad hoc features. My conclusion is yes, and the only tools required
are lump-sum taxes and transfers.9
Assume there is a government (or a public institution) that could carry out
costless lump-sum taxes and transfers to individuals. This same government could
have carried out mass redistribution as described before. Eventually, what this
7Remember that all individuals are identical except for the bequest they receive. I feel that
the conclusion will be even stronger, if the people are heterogeneous in skills, and egalitarian
redistribution destroys any economic incentive for any high-potential individuals. This is, of
course, a subject for another project.
8If anyone with level of wealth below g is considered to be in poverty, then the head-count
ratio is the fraction of population with wealth below that level.
9Admittedly, one may argue this is ad hoc in a way, and I partly agree. But I feel it is rather
minimal since I do not introduce any new features that would alter the dynamics of the economy
at all. All other policy recommendations are aimed at changing the structure of the economy.
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government will want to do is to tax everyone and to target the transfer to a
poor dynasty, getting it over the threshold. Then wait for economic growth to
push all dynasties back to the tricker point where the government again carries
out another taxes and target the transfer to another poor dynasty. The process
(more like an algorithm) continues until everyone is above the threshold g. At this
point everyone and all the generations thereafter have enough incentive to invest
in human capital.
Let me now describe the redistribution scheme formally. For simplicity, let me
first start with an economy where every dynasty is at the lower steady-state, xn. At
this level, the economy has no investment in human capital at all. People simply
work, save, and bequeath. The following proposition summarizes the result and
states the sufficient conditions for the scheme to go through. I provide a proof in
a longer but instructive fashion, outlining explicitly the steps for the government.
The first sufficient condition requires that aggregate wealth in the economy is
enough to support at least one dynasty over the threshold. I do not think of this
as too strong of a requirement. The second condition imposes a restriction on the
wage differential. Intuitively, it conveys that the skilled wage must be large enough
to compensate for the missing unskilled wage as a consequence of the upgrading.
Proposition 18. Suppose the economy has all L dynasties at the initial wealth of
x¯n. If the economy’s parameters is such that
i.) Lx¯n > g
ii.) x¯s − x¯n > g,
then there is a sequence of lump-sum taxes and transfers on bequest to achieve full
human-capital accumulation.
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Proof. I proceed in a sequence of steps. Define a positive small residual, ε > 0, from
the two sufficient conditions i.) and ii.) such that min {Lx¯n − g, x¯s − x¯n − g} >
ε > 0, then let g˜ = g + ε. As it will turn out, the neighborhood ε will form
a tricker point for the government’s action. In addition, as will be clear later,
ε-neighborhood will guarantee a finite implementation time.
Step 1. First, I will try to push one dynasty beyond the threshold g. Select a
dynasty randomly.10 Let T1 be the amount of transfer this dynasty receives and
t1 be the tax paid by every dynasty in Step 1. The minimum necessary transfer is
the amount just enough to get one dynasty pass g after paying taxes, or simply
T1 = g˜ − x¯n + t1.
This transfer is financed by lump-sum taxes on all individuals (since all dynaties
are identical at this point, there is no need for different taxes). The revenue from
the tax collection must equal to the transfer above, which yields
Lt1 = g˜ − x¯n + t1, or tn1 =
g˜ − x¯n
L− 1 ,
where tn1 denotes tax on unskilled dynasties in the first step. Subtituting this back




Note that the burden of transfer is borne by L − 1 dynasties. Condition i.) from
the statement of the proposition guarantees that after-tax income of all dynasties
will be non-negative.
Step k + 1. In this step, there are currently k dynasties above the threshold
g, while L − k are still below it. So I want to allow two different levels of taxes:
10Randomness is not necessary here. In fact, for this proposition, I could simply choose dynasty
by its label, 1, 2, ..., L. Randomness will play a more important role in the political economy
section below.
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tnk+1 on the unskilled, and t
s
k+1 on the skilled dynasties. I also need a little timing
tool to help me characterize the algorithm completely. Let τ be the elapsed time
since the last distribution scheme (that is, since step k is completed). At the time
of this redistribution, I will want to tax the skilled dynasties maximally, while still
maintaining their position above the threshold g. This means
tsk+1 = x
s
τ − g˜, (3.1)
where xsτ denotes the bequest of the skilled dynasty at the elapsed time τ . Again,
let select a dynasty from those who are still below g. The lucky dynasty will receive
a transfer equals to
Tk+1 = g˜ − xnτ + tnk+1, (3.2)
where Tk+1 is the amount of transfer received by the unskilled, x
n
τ is the bequest
of the unskilled dynasty, and tnk+1 is the amount of tax on all unskilled dynasties.
Balanced budget of the government requires that tax revenue from both types
must equal the single transfer to the selected unskilled dynasty, that is
(L− k)tnk+1 + ktsk+1 = Tk+1.
Using equation (3.1) and (3.3) in the balanced budget above and rearrange, I
obtain the tax level on each unskilled dynasty as
tnk+1 =
(k + 1)g˜ − xnτ − kxsτ
L− k − 1 , (3.3)
and the transfer to the lucky dynasty as
Tk+1 =
Lg˜ − (L− k)xnτ − kxsτ
L− k − 1 . (3.4)
Before redistributing, I must make sure that the after-tax income of the unskilled
dynasty is non-negative, that is xnτ − tnk+1 ≥ 0. To do that, I make use of equation
(3.3) to get
(L− k)xnτ + kxsτ ≥ (k + 1)g˜. (3.5)
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There is a good intuition behind this equation. It tells us that we can only redis-
tribute if the aggregate income in the economy is enough to support the ”after-
redistribution” distribution that we want (having k + 1 dynasties at g˜). Lastly, I
define for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., L− 1},
τ ∗k+1 = min {τ > 0 : (L− k)xnτ + kxsτ ≥ (k + 1)g˜} .
I think of τ ∗k+1 as the ”wait time” before implementing the (k+ 1)
th redistribution
scheme.11 The whole taxes and transfers scheme in Step k+ 1 can be defined as a
function of this wait time. Once the condition in the definition of τ ∗k+1 is met, the
time is prime for carrying out the scheme described prior by equation (3.1), (3.3),
and (3.4).
Step L. Now all the L−1 dynasties are on the skilled path of the economy, while
only one is below the threshold. This last step is similar to the ones above, with
slight alterations. First, let me not tax the only poor household in the economy.
Second, it may not be necessary to tax the richer household as far as all the way
back to g˜. I only need to collect enough tax to push the last household pass g˜.
These insights boil down to a supporting condition that
xnτ + (L− 1)xsτ ≥ Lg˜,
or the aggregate income in the economy must be enough to support the entire
country living beyond the threshold g˜. I define the wait time between Step L-1
and Step L to be τ ∗L = min{τ > 0 : xnτ + (L − 1)xsτ > Lg˜}. As noted above, tax
on the poor is zero, tnL = 0. So the budget constraint gives a solution to the final
amount of tax and transfer
tsL =
g˜ − xnτ∗L




11I show below that this wait time, τ∗k+1, is finite for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., L− 1} in Lemma 19.
Therefore, it justifies my use of the word ”minimum” rather than ”infimum.”
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The cost of my last redistribution scheme is spread over head of the skilled house-
holds.
This leaves a positive note. At least, under the assumption in the model,
club convergence is no longer a universal law like gravity. There is a room for
improvement. I can draw some interesting lessons from equation (3.3). The higher
the income level of each group, the less tax burden there is on the poor. This is
because I need less transfer the fill in the gap between the poor’s wealth and the
threshold level. Since the rich group is a contributor, the higher their income, the
easier the scheme is on the poor. So economic growth is an important ingredient
in the effectiveness of this redistribution scheme. In addition, at the beginning of
Step k+1, I mention that I want to tax skilled household maximally. This is not a
necessary requirement. Nonetheless, any dollar less in tax on the skilled dynasties
implies a dollar increase in the tax on the unskilled dynasties or a longer wait time.
The following lemma shows that the entire implementation time of the redis-
tribution above is finite. I prove this by showing that each wait time defined in
Proposition 18 is finite, so the finite sum of all L wait times must indeed be finite.
To prove this analytically, I utilize the two conditions in Proposition 18 and the
convergence properties of the the sequence of bequests.
Lemma 19. Define τ ∗1 = 0 as the wait time for the first step. Then for every
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., L}, the wait time τ ∗k < ∞. Therefore, the total implementation time




Proof. First, I define x¯n ≡ lim
τ→∞
xnτ = and x¯s ≡ lim
τ→∞
xsτ as the lower and the higher
steady state in the model, respectively. Under the parametric assumptions, all
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sequences of bequests converge to a limit point. Second, these sequences are con-
verging from below, thus they are monotonically increasing. Recall that after a
redistribution, the bequest of every dynasty is positioned below its limit point.
Now, I define the aggregate income of the economy in Step k+1 as another se-
quence by xkτ = (L− k)xnτ + kxsτ . Then
lim
τ→∞
xkτ = (L− k)xn∞ + kxs∞
= (L− k)x¯n + kx¯s
> (k + 1)g˜,
where the inequality follows from using condition i.) and ii.) in Proposition 18
and also the definition of g˜. Since the sequence of aggregate income also converges
monotonically to its limit, (L − k)x¯n + kx¯s, by definition of convergence, there
exists a τ ∗k+1 < ∞ such that for every τ > τ ∗k+1, I must have (k + 1)g˜ < xkτ <
(L− k)x¯n + kx¯s. In words, any convergent sequence has a requirement that, for a
time big enough but finite, the sequence must lie within a neighborhood around
its limit point forever from then on. This proof remains valid for every step k ∈
{0, 1, 2, ..., L− 1}. Finally, the finite sum of a collection of finite numbers is finite.
So the total implementation time is finite.
This result is rather heartwarming: we can, in fact, eradicate poverty (within
this model) in finite time. Finite is still nonetheless too vague. Even though
it is already a restriction from infinity, finiteness could still mean many things.
Unfortunately, I do not have a result that will strengthen my notion of ”finiteness”
in this chapter. Despite these weaknesses, I will discuss what we can learn from
this Lemma more thoroughly below.
So far, I have provided results based on only one initial distribution of wealth:
everyone starts at the lower steady-state, x¯n. To address this issue, the next
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proposition generalizes the idea developed in Proposition 18 to encompass arbitrary
initial distribution of wealth. In proving the proposition, I use the following logic.
If you could redistribute with any steps described in Proposition 18, do so. If
you cannot, the bequest dynamics will take you to the point where you eventually
could. This implies additional wait time, but only in the first step, and still is
finite.
Proposition 20. Any economy with the parameters satisfying the two conditions
i.) Lx¯n > g
ii.) x¯s − x¯n > g,
can escape the poverty trap with a sequence of lump-sum taxes and transfers, re-
gardless of the economy’s initial distribution of wealth.
Proof. Notice that, if the economy has a positive number of dynasty, say k, be-
yond g˜ = g + ε, defined properly above in Proposition 18, then the economy can
immediately proceed with Step k + 1 of Proposition 18. There is no further work
to be done for this case. The new work that requires a verification is when the
initial distribution places all individuals below g˜, but not at the same wealth level.
Let xt,l be the bequest of dynasty l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}. All of xt,l are smaller than g˜.
Select a dynasty l∗ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} to receive the transfer T1,l∗ = g˜− (xτ̂∗1 ,l∗ − t1,l∗),
where τ̂ ∗1 denotes the first elapsed time. The tax revenue collected must be enough
to finance the transfer,
∑L
l=1t1,l = g˜ − xτ̂∗1 ,l∗ + t1,l∗ , which gives the equation∑
l 6=l∗
t1,l = g˜ − xτ̂∗1 ,l∗ .
I cannot redistribute unless, for every l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}, xτ̂∗1 ,l − t1,l ≥ 0. Summing
across l 6= l∗, I get ∑l 6=l∗ xτ̂∗1 ,l ≥ g˜ − xτ̂∗1 ,l∗ . In light of Proposition 18, it is clear
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that I will want to wait until
∑L
l=1xτ̂∗1 ,l ≥ g˜, before proceeding with the first
redistribution. Condition i.) guarantees that such τ̂ ∗1 exists and is finite. From
then on, I simply follow steps outlined in Proposition 18.
Will this proposition alter the result of finiteness above? No. The finiteness
shown in Lemma 19 applies to all initial wealth distribution satisfying the sufficient
conditions i.)− ii.). Although, one type of initial distribution may just take longer
than the other.
In this section, I provide a new possibility to overcome the poverty trap. My
results show that the poor economies could do better, with the help of redistri-
bution and economic growth. However, this requires a (sequence of) benevolent
government(s) with enormous foresight to implement the proposed redistribution
scheme. In the next section, this long-term political commitment is investigated.
3.4 Political Obstacles to Development
In this section, I attempt to shed light on whether or not the redistribution policy
will survive the political process. Consider a political institution, possibly demo-
cratic, with a parameter δ denoting the political power of the skilled dynasties. For
example, when δ = 30%, the skilled dynasties only need to form at least 30% of the
voting population in order to have the decisive power to implement their preferred
policy. A balanced (two-group) democratic institution would have δ = 50%.12
The intuition for the next proposition is the following. Because the transfers
only benefit the poor dynasties, there is no incentive for the rich to continue with
12In a two-group democracy, for example, δ could be 50% for just majority or 60% for super-
majority.
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the redistribution scheme. I view this as related to the idea of Kuznets’s hypothesis
(see Kuznets [1955]): process of transition from developing to developed must go
through a period of high inequality in the economy. This transition also brings
about a shift in political power. Once the rich dynasties garner enough political
support, the redistribution program is forever on a halt. I formally organize this
line of arguments in the following proposition.
Proposition 21. For any political institution with δ < 100%, the redistribution
scheme will not survive in the political process.
Proof. Because the model reduces heterogeneity down to two groups, those above
and below g, I focus on the two sets of indirect preferences. When thinking about
indirect utilities, I note that they are risk-neutral with respect to uncertainty in
wealth (recall that V = ey, where y is lifetime resources). Therefore, it suffices
for me to simply focus on the expected lifetime resources of the pivotal voter. But
these depend linearly on the level of bequest, so instead I can just focus on what
happens to individual bequest.
Clearly if the pivotal voter has bequest above g, there will be no redistribution.
The skilled dynasties only pay taxes and receive no benefits. That means, as soon
as those above the threshold g have gathered enough political leverage, the redis-
tribution scheme stops. The termination is imminent because the scheme keeps
adding to the size of the skilled group. The question now is, will the redistribution
scheme ever takes place at all? I analyze this in details.
Assume all dynasties are below g, as in Step 1, and a dynasty is chosen with




T1, where t1 and T1 are uniform tax and targeted transfer, respectively. For
simplicity, let me consider the homogeneous initial distribution with everyone at
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L−1 from Proposition 18, I see that expected bequest remains exactly at
xτ . Whether or not there will be redistribution depends on how indifferent voters
vote. If I assume that they vote the brighter future, then the redistribution scheme
will begin.13
For Step k + 1, let τ ∗k+1 denote the time of taxing. The expected wealth of an
unskilled dynasty is xnτ∗k+1 − tk+1 +
1
L−kTk+1. Using equation (3.1), (3.4), and (3.3),






− g˜) > xnτ∗k+1 .
The more numerous the skilled dynasties are (as denoted by k), the higher the
benefits the unskilled can expect from the transfer. Hence, as long as the political
power lays in the hands of the unskilled dynasties, the redistribution scheme will
continue. Of course, only so until the political power changes hand.
The mechanism that stops economic development in my case is economic losers
not political losers as in Acemoglu and Robinson [2000]. However, the process of
development comes from devising a dynamic plan of income redistribution instead
of technology. Political losers in this case are the unskilled dynasties, who lose
power as soon as the pivotal voter moves over the threshold.
Unfortunately, the proposition also implies that all forms of governance will not
take the economy to the bright future with this policy. This includes dictatorship
and democracy. On can think of the dictatorship regime as having δ = 1
L
. The
dictator will has an incentive to only push his dynasty over the threshold, and may
13It can be shown that, for initial distribution with heterogeneous poor households, those with
the the tax rate t1,l∗ ≤
g˜−xτ̂∗1 ,l∗
L−1 will vote for the policy. Thus the redistribution is more likely to
be adopted in very poor economies.
96
be some other selected few. Even if the dictatorship regime is overthrown (either
by domestic or international forces) and the economy transforms into a democracy,
the bitterness of Proposition 21 will eventually kick in. I should point out that, in
spite of these results, I believe that democracy at least will reduce more poverty
than dictatorship.
Admittedly, this section reaches a negative conclusion for both democracy and
dictatorship. A simple hypothesis here is that the rate at which poverty is reduced
by policies will diminish as the economy transits from its developing to developed
status due to a shift in political sentiment. The policymakers of any country
must be careful with political conflicts arising from inequality along the path of
development. Hence, the medium-income economies could remain ”medium” for a
long time if the domestic politics focus heavily on redistribution. The key question
that I have now is, how will these medium-income economies reconcile its domestic
conflicts and pull itself out of this transitional trap? Many east and southeast
Asian countries have successfully done so. But many other countries, including
those from the same region, still struggle to cross over to the threshold. I offer
some further discussions in the next section.
3.5 Discussion
I assume that there is a public institution that could costlessly carry out lump-
sum taxes and transfers. Realistically, there is nothing near such a frictionless
feature. Tax and transfer policies are often costly, both economically and polit-
ically. However, even if such tools were to approximately exist, they fall short
of being perfect. A dollar of transfer would often fail to generate a dollar worth
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activity in the developing world (see, for example, Easterly [2001]).
On the method of redistribution, I have one point to re-emphasize. Although,
in the chapter, I always tax the skilled dynasties maximally, I am always careful
not to destroy their incentive to invest in human capital (and the incentive of their
later generations). I do so by maintaining their position above the threshold level g˜.
So we must not destroy any incentive of the most efficient worker in the economy,
since effective redistribution scheme needs them. It is worth mentioning that I
allow no labor emigration. So there is no braindrian in the economy. If, however,
I allow individuals to choose either to be in or out of the economy, enforcing taxes
on the skilled dynasty will be harder to achieve. And frankly, without them, the
whole redistribution scheme is an impossible task.
Finiteness of my redistribution scheme is a plus, but still is not the reason to
celebrate. The set of possible implementation time turns out to equal to the set
of positive reals. Further works need to be done here. There are a few additional
things I could say to improve relatively the size of this finite time. Recall that
g = (1−α)[h(1+i)−ws]
(1+i)(1−α)−1 , while g˜ = g + ε. Any policy measure that reduces g will im-




[(1+i)(1−α)−1]2 > 0. So a reduction in the cost of investment in human
capital, h, a decrease the borrowing interest rate, and an increase in wage of skilled
workers, ws, all help lowering g thus lowering the implementation time. They re-
duce the amount of time necessary for the economy to accumulate wealth enough
to support the after-tax redistribution. Relevant policies will include subsidizing
education, providing cheap and accessible education funds for the poorer class, and
encouraging R & D investment.14 Note that skill-biased technological progress may
14I am implicitly under the assumption that improvement in technology lifts the income the
skilled faster relative to those unskilled. See, for example, Krusell et. al. [2000]. In fact, I only
require an increase in ws, so relativity does not matter here. See Krusell et. al. [2000].
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not be detrimental if the right redistribution mechanism is at play. This generates
a premium as an additional incentive to go to school and be educated. As ar-
gued convincingly in chapter 4 of Easterly [2001], incentive for education matters.
”Creating skills where there exists no technology to use them is not going to foster
economic growth [page 73].”
I have mentioned that, in contrast to Acemoglu and Robinson [2000], my po-
litical economy obstacle to development is driven by economic, not political losers.
However, if I push along line of this Acemoglu et. al. [2001]’s idea of political losers,
the group of unskilled dynasties may, in fact, decide not push the decisive voter
pass the threshold. In that way, taxation of the rich continues forever (and may
eventually turns into expropriation), while the revenues collected will be divided
among the unskilled dynasties. Such action is conceivable, and will eventually
destroy all the incentives to invest in the future and encourage a flight of brains
and capital to elsewhere. Nonetheless, because I do not endogenize the political
selection mechanism here, this sequence of thoughts needs further and rigorous
exploration. Without that, this is simply a matter of an educated speculation.
Lastly, there is a strong stylized fact that skilled laborers tend to provide pos-
itive externality to one another. For example, a celebrated work of Kremer [1993]
argues that skilled labor provide positive externality to one another. Kremer and
Maskin [1996] also finds further empirical evidence supporting this position. That
means, the more skilled labors a country has, the more productive the skilled labors
are. If labors are paid according to their productivity, this translates a positive re-
lationship between the size of skilled labor force and their wage, in contrast to the
usual diminishing returns. This feature is absent from the Galor-Zeira’s analysis,
and subsequently also from mine. If there is an increasing returns to being a skilled
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labor, then the political obstacle from the skilled dynasties would be weakened.
I still caution those policymakers fond of redistribution. Unfortunately, if we
believe even slightly in the logic of the political economy section (Proposition 21),
we must conclude that all forms of government cannot take the economy to the
bright future through redistribution alone. Moreover, a heavy reliance on the
redistribution scheme would generate a brain flight and rid the economy of any
chance to escape poverty. Prosperity of the economy should, at the end, comes
from institutional reforms and technological advancement, not from redistribution
alone.
3.6 Conclusion
Previous studies on poverty traps show that egalitarian redistribution may have
an adverse effect on the economy by pulling everyone down below the threshold
for the trap. The chapter sets out to address simple, but subtle, questions: Can
redistribution help all the poor escape the poverty trap? And if so, will the redis-
tribution policy survive to fulfill its purpose from the political process? To shed
lights on the answers, I use on a particular model of poverty traps studied in Galor
and Zeira [1993]. Despite the emphasis on a particular model, my result on redis-
tribution can easily be generalized to other models. In return for the specificity,
however, I get to draw deeper insights into the issue at hands with well-specified
behavioral and economic parameters.
It turns out that, indeed, a careful dynamic redistribution can be an escape for
the economy out of a poverty trap. In the chapter, I carefully crafted a scheme of
taxes and transfers that get this result. First, I push a dynasty pass the poverty
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threshold, then I patiently wait for wealth accumulation from both the poor and
the rich group. Once sufficient amount of wealth is available in the economy, I
again push another dynasty over the threshold. I repeat this process until every
dynasty is above the threshold.
Furthermore, I show that my redistribution scheme can achieve the result in
finite amount of time. As aforementioned, finite is still too vague. Although one
can never precisely pin down the actual day and time that the redistribution scheme
will succeed, I believe that an efficiency result should nonetheless be within reach
of future work. Can we do better than the algorithm here, for example, pushing
more than just one dynasty at a time above the threshold? How much control
do we have over the implementation time by varying different parameters in the
model?
As for my political economic inquiry, I have not endogenized the political choice
of the redistribution policy. I take the redistribution scheme above as given and
analyze whether or not it would be adopted. Unfortunately, the redistribution will
not survive the political struggle. When the economy transits from a poor to a
richer status, the political influence of the wealthier dynasties will also grow. Even-
tually, the redistribution scheme will be stopped. Future works may be interested
in modeling the political process in the similar fashion to those of Acemoglu and
Robinson [2006]. Such a framework will allow for an endogeneous determination
of tax rates, which I have no reason to believe that it will be equal to my analysis
here. It will further allow for choices of different regimes and actions, for example,
revolution, expropriation, and taxes.
Using this essay, I argue for a policy that balances both growth and redistri-
bution objective. I also support an active role of the government in providing
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education subsidies and education funds, while making sure that the rewards to
being skilled remains high. Effective redistribution, as a tool against poverty, re-
quires inputs from the rich (and skilled) households. Prosperity of the economy
should, at the end, come from institutional supports and reforms in congruence
with technological advancement, not from redistribution alone. In light of recent
trend in globalization and skill-biased technological progress, policymakers face
tougher challenges in taming inequality while continue promoting growth. Trying
to strike a balance between the two objectives will remain an art, not science, for
the policymakers, and a lifetime research agenda for the academia.
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APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 1
A.1 Proofs of the Propositions
Proof. (Proposition 2) I prove this proposition in two steps. First, I show that
if the young in this period will try to influence the identity of the decisive voter
in the next period, they prefer to put themselves as the majority instead of other
group. This may seem obvious, but it requires a rigorous verification. By using the
inequalities from Appendix A.2 and A.3, there are two cases to consider. The proof
uses the same logic in all cases: the binding restriction for having the unskilled
as the largest in the next period turns out to be a subset of the restrictions for
having the old as the largest group in the next period. However, to facilitate the
proposition using the indirect utilities, I know that ∂V
s
∂σt




to σt = 1, as long as µt > 0.
(i) When st ≤ 11+n , to have the old dominate the largest in the next period,
I have n − (1 + n)st ≤ µt ≤ 1−(1+n)stm . With σt = 1, ∂V
h
∂µt
> 0 for both
h ∈ {s, u}, so µht = 1−(1+n)stm . This is higher than the level necessary to have
the unskilled dominate, n− (1 + n)st.
(ii) When st >
1
1+n
, for next period old to dominate the unskilled requires n −
(1 + n)st ≤ µt. But the condition for this case implies n− (1 + n)st < 0, so
the inequality is always true. I focus solely on the old dominating the skilled
in the next period, which requires µt(1− (1 +m)σt) ≥ (1 + n)st − 1. Notice
that there is a bound to which σt could go up to. Having the unskilled as
the largest in the next period requires that µt(m− (1 +m)σt) ≥ (1 + n)st −
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n. It turns out that the latter condition is simply a strict subset of the
first inequality, which means that they can always get strictly higher skilled
composition with the same immigration quota. Therefore, it is better for the
skilled young to place itself as the decisive old in the next period .
Lastly, to tie down the proposition, I must show that the policy choices provided
in the proposition are optimal for each group. In addition, I must prove that there
is an incentive for the young to restrict their choice of immigration today, in order
to place themselves as the decisive old in the next period. I consider first the
preference of the old,






(st + σtµt) (w
s
t )
1+ε + (1− st + σt(1− µt)) (wut )1+ε
}




Differentiation reveals that ∂V
o
∂σt
> 0, when µt > 0, and
∂V o
∂µt
> 0, when σt is
sufficiently high. This gives µot = σ
o
t = 1. Differentiating with respect to tax, τt,
and setting equal to zero yield τ ot =
1
1+ε
, the Laffer point.
Next I turn my attention to the young. Since wages are kept fixed and the
skilled will never implement a positive tax on themselves, there is no channel for
the skilled to be affected by immigration in this period. However, if the skilled
weighs in the future, what they could gain appears more vivid. Consider the skilled
young’s preference, under the assumption that ws > wu, the skilled voters want








Because immigration in this period does not affect anything else in period t, the
skilled young consider the benefits they could reap in the next period from skilled
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immigrants. These are exactly the preference of the old generation in period t+ 1.
Nonetheless, if they maximally open the economy to skilled immigration, σt = 1 =
µt, the skilled voters will dominate in t + 1, and Tt+1 = 0. Therefore, the skilled
must restrict some skilled immigrants to ensure the existence of next period’s
transfer. Consider first when st ≤ 11+n , I know from above analysis that µst =
1−(1+n)st
m
and σst = 1. When st >
1
1+n
, I have a complication; the skilled group
in this period is growing too fast. In order to not place the decisive power in
the hands of the next period’s skilled, it becomes necessary to restrict both skill
composition of the immigrants and immigration volume. The eventual choice can
be specified implicitly as the solution to the exercise









s. t. (1 + n)st − 1 ≤ µt(1− (1 +m)σt).
The restrictive condition in the optimization problem comes from trying to have
the old dominate the skilled young in the next period. When the solution to the
















Turning now to the preference of the unskilled young, differentiating the un-











+ 1− st + (1− σt)µt





assuming interior solution. This can be solved for τut in the form described in the
proposition with






+ 1− st + (1− σt)µt




Notice that the case st >
1
1+n
cannot happen if the unskilled group is the largest.
As for the policy choice on immigration, I must compare utilities that the unskilled
voters would receive if they implement the ideal policy irrespective of any politi-
cal consideration about the next period versus if they implement more restrictive
policies in order to put themselves as the decisive old in the next period. I denote
with T̂t the transfer this period with µt = 1 = σt, and I denote with T
u
t the transfer
they would have gotten with σt = 1 and µt =
1−(1+n)st
m
. Such comparison concludes
that the unskilled young will with old some immigration quotas if and only if
0 < T ut + βT
o
t+1 − T̂t = Ψ
(
σt = 1, µt =




Can this condition be satisfied? I believe so. I know that T ot > T̂t > T
u
t (where
T ot is the transfer level preferred by the old in period t), if the level of transfer
preferred by the old in the next period is close to the transfer preferred by the old
voters in this period (T ot+1 ≈ T ot ), then there is β such that this inequality will
undoubtedly hold.
Proof. (Proposition 4) First, I recognize that, in any period t, there are three
possible states of the world: either the skilled workers, unskilled workers, or old




the skilled group is the largest bloc and unskilled and the old voters will collude
their votes to the unskilled representative. When the skilled voters are not the
absolute majority, whether they vote es∗t = ”s” or ”u”, the policies preferred by
the unskilled will be implemented. None has any incentive to change their voting
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strategy, given the others’ voting strategy. The case where the old retirees are the
largest can be argued in a similar manner. When the unskilled group is the largest
and votes for its representative candidate, the two groups’ votes have no pivotal
power (under assumption 5, no weakly dominated strategy).












(st + σtµt) (w
s)1+ε + (1− st + (1− σt)µt) (wu)1+ε
)




I know that such a tax policy exists, because the payoff in this period (holding
the transfer in the next period constant) to the unskilled is maximized at the
preferred policy and zero at τ = 1. Therefore, at some τ˜ ∈ [0, 1], the equality will
hold. Any tax higher than this cut-off level would appear as too ”redistributive”
(or ”extractive”) to the unskilled voters and, on the contrary, any tax below this,
they still benefit from the welfare state. When 1
1+ε
≤ τ˜ , the unskilled workers




, then opening of
the economy fully to the skilled immigrants will not place the skilled young as the
absolute majority in the next period. If the old voters always vote for themselves,
the unskilled young can either vote for themselves, when they are the largest, or
vote for the old and enjoy some redistribution. When the victory goes to the
old candidate, under the parameters I described, the next period’s largest group
will be skilled. However, the collusion of votes between the unskilled and the old
voters will still prevail in the next period and the redistribution continues at the
rate preferred by next period’s old (which will be ideal for this period’s young).




, voting for the old will place the next period’s skilled voters as
the absolute majority, guaranteeing no redistribution in the next period. In this
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case, the unskilled voters will vote for their candidate and, with the help of the
skilled voters, get to implement their preferred policies.
Proof. (Proposition 6) The cut-off tax level τ˜ is defined in the proof for Propo-
sition 5. With 1
1+ε
> τ˜ , both the skilled and unskilled young try to avoid the
policies of the old. Both will vote for the skilled candidate whenever the old is the
largest group, thus getting the preferred policies of the skilled implemented. On
the contrary, the old voters will try to avoid the policies of the skilled young, by
voting for the unskilled candidate when the skilled voters are the largest group,
hence resulting in the policies preferred by the unskilled workers.
Proof. (Proposition 7) Consider first the preference of the unskilled young. The
unskilled wage is given by equation (1.11), which responds positively to σt. So
there are three channels to which the composition of immigrants this period affect
their preference: wage, this period’s transfer, and next period’s transfer. All three
channels benefit from increasing this period’s skilled immigrants. Differentiating






) 1− st + (1− σt)µt
(1− α)
(





assuming interior solution. This can be solved for τut in the form described in the
proposition with
K(µt, σt, st, µt−1) =
1− st + (1− σt)µt
(1− α)
(




For period t, the unskilled voters seem to prefer σut = 1. However, before drawing a
definite conclusion, I must compare the two levels of utility generated by completely
allowing for maximum possible skilled immigrants and restricting them in order
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to be the decisive voter in the next period. The unskilled young would try to
influence next period’s identity of the decisive voter if
V ut (σt = 1, µt =
1− (1 + n)st
m
, τut ) > V
u
t (σt = 1, µt = 1, τ
u
t ).
So I could define an auxiliary function as their difference Ψ̂(σt = 1, µt =
1−(1+n)st
m
) = V ut (σt = 1, µt =
1−(1+n)st
m
, τut )− V ut (σt = 1, µt = 1, τut ).
As for the native-born skilled workers, the situation becomes increasingly more
complex. Their preferred tax rate for this period is still zero, τ st = 0. However,
skilled immigrants generate both cost and benefit to the native-born skilled. They
provide a direct labor market competition, forcing the current skilled wage down.
Ideally, the skilled natives would have preferred all unskilled immigrants for this
reason. However, skilled immigrants also provide future benefits through higher
transfer in the next period. This conflict makes their policy choices unclear. One
thing is clear, nevertheless, the skilled will always believe that there is positive
future benefit once they retired. To see this, consider if they think the skilled will
for the majority next period, hence T st+1 = 0. Then the only gain from immigrants
would come from bringing as many unskilled in as possible to lift up the wage.
That leads to σt = 0, and µt = 1, which in turn will make the unskilled voters the
largest in the next period. But this produces a contradiction to the initial belief of
the skilled. Hence I know that, if the skilled voters are the largest in this period,
next period’s decisive voter will either be the unskilled young or the old. With
this information, there are two problems to solve. First, if next period’s decisive





V st = α
1+εα(1− α)ε(1−α)A1+εt
(




s.t. n+ µtm ≥ (1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt.
If the decisive voter in the next period is controlled by the old, the utility to this
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V st = α
1+εα(1− α)ε(1−α)A1+εt
(




s.t. 1 + µt ≥ (1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt
and (1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt ≥ n+ µtm.




t the utility received by the skilled young given
that, respectively, the unskilled young and the old form the largest group in
the next period. Note that the constraints need not be binding. The solu-
tion to each problem could lie entirely in the interior of the constraint set. To
conclude on the policy choices of the skilled young, they must be such that









Turning my attention to the old, their preference comes directly from the trans-
fer.
V ot = Tt
=
τt(1− τt)εαεα(1− α)ε(1−α)A1+εt(
1 + µt +
1+µt−1
1+n+µt−1(1+m)
) (st + µtσt)α (1− st + µt(1− σt))1−α .
Optimization reveals that τ ot =
1
1+ε
. In addition, I find that the interior optimal
composition of skilled immigrants is given by
σot =












1 , if s+µt
1+µt
< α.
Under my maintained assumption that the skilled wage is higher than unskilled






1− s+ µ(1− σ)
)(
1 + µt +
1 + µt−1




Using the assumption that the wage is higher for the skilled than the unskilled
workers, and imposing σot = 1, I can conclude that µ
o
t = 1.
A.2 The Largest Group: Some Accounting
It is important to see who forms the largest political group in the economy and
under what conditions. Remember that the largest group only needs to have its
size bigger than the other groups separately, but not necessary collectively.
• Skilled workers are the largest group under two conditions. First, its
size must dominate the unskilled young, and, second, it must also dominate







respectively. It can be shown that, under parameter restrictions above, the
second condition of dominating the old cohort is sufficient.1
• Unskilled workers are the largest group under two conditions: domi-
nating the size of the skilled young and the old cohort. These conditions are
given respectively by st ≤ 12 and 1− st > 1+µt−11+n+µt−1(1+m) . Again, with the re-
strictions on parameters above, satisfying the second dominance is sufficient.
• Old retirees are the largest group when its size is larger than both skilled
and unskilled young. This means
1 + µt−1
1 + n+ µt−1(1 +m)
≥ max{st, 1− st}.
1To see this, using n < m ≤ 1 and µ ∈ [0, 1], I can get the following string of inequalities:
1 + µ
1 + n+ µ(1 +m)
>
1 + µ





So if the skilled could dominate the old cohort, they automatically dominate the unskilled cohort.
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A.3 Today’s Immigration Policies and Tomorrow’s Largest
Group
This subsection takes a look at how the choice of immigration policy variables in
period t leads to a change in the identity of the largest group in period t+1. Recall
that the model’s skill dynamics are driven by the following equation
st+1 =
(1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt
1 + n+ µt(1 +m)
.
I assume weak inequality throughout, that is, if the decisive voters in this period
try to influence the identity of the largest group in the next period, they will get
their way as long as they make it to the threshold. This assumption is to ensure
the existence of an optimum, by making the constraint set compact.
• For the skilled young to be the largest in period t+ 1, I need two conditions:
st+1 ≥ 12 and st+1 ≥ 1+µt1+n+µt(1+m) . The first inequality is redundant (as
previously discussed), so only the second equality plays a roll here. Therefore,
using the skill dynamics, the condition for the skilled young to be the largest
group boils down to selecting σt and µt to satisfy (1 + n)st + (1 +m)σtµt ≥
1 + µt. This inequality gives rise to two cases, depending on the state of the
economy.
(i) When st <
1
1+n
, I have µt((1 +m)σt − 1) ≥ 1− (1 + n)st.
(ii) When st >
1
1+n
, I have (1 + n)st − 1 ≥ µt(1− (1 +m)σt).
• For the unskilled young to be the largest group in period t + 1, I need two
conditions: 1 − st+1 ≥ 12 and 1 − st+1 ≥ 1+µt1+n+µt(1+m) . Again, I only need to
focus on the second inequality, which leads to (1 + n)(1− st) + (1 +m)(1−
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σt)µt ≥ 1 + µt. I also have two possible cases, depending on the state of the
economy.
(i) When st <
n
1+n
, I have n− (1 + n)st ≥ µt((1 +m)σt −m).
(ii) When st >
n
1+n
, I have µt(m− (1 +m)σt) ≥ (1 + n)st − n.
• For the old to dominate in size in period t + 1, I need two conditions:
1+µt
1+n+µt(1+m)
≥ st+1 and 1+µt1+n+µt(1+m) ≥ 1 − st+1, dominating the skilled and
the unskilled, respectively. Both of these inequalities are important for craft-
ing the right immigration policy to achieve the desired identity of the largest
group. I have three cases to consider.
(i) When st <
n
1+n
, the old must
1. dominate the skilled, µt((1 +m)σt − 1) ≤ 1− (1 + n)st , and
2. dominate the unskilled, n− (1 + n)st ≤ µt((1 +m)σt −m).







, the old must
1. dominate the skilled, µt((1 +m)σt − 1) ≤ 1− (1 + n)st, and
2. dominate the unskilled, µt(m− (1 +m)σt) ≤ (1 + n)st − n.
(iii) When st >
1
1+n
, the old must
1. dominate the skilled, (1 + n)st − 1 ≤ µt(1− (1 +m)σt), and
2. dominate the unskilled, µt(m− (1 +m)σt) ≤ (1 + n)st − n.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Proofs
Proof. (Corollary 9) I will show that ln (Rt+1) is increasing in µt under the given
condition. To do so, I use nt = 1 + n+ µt(1 +m), and differentiate the expression








1 + n+ µt(1 +m)
> 0.
To have positive response on the rate of return, I must have
γ <
1 +m
(1 + n) (1− αφ)− αφµt(1 +m)
which must hold for all µt. Therefore, it is sufficient to have it hold for the lowest
value of µt, implying that γ <
1+m
(1−n)(1−αφ) . With assumed parameter restrictions,
this inequality always holds.
Proof. (Proposition 11) Assume for the purpose of this proof that n < 0 < m.
The other cases of these parameters are straightforward to see as no generation
has influence over the identity of the decisive voter in the next period. Then for
v(µt−1) ≥ 1, old generation forms the decision and hence will choose the maximal
openness, that is µt = 1. This follows directly from their preference, which I restate
below





+ lnwt−1 − ln qt−1 +Bo (B.1)
V yt (µt, µt+1, kt) = (1 + β(1− φ(1− α)))α ln kt + β(1− α) [lnnt + ln(1 + γµt+1)]
−((1 + β)α + β(1− α)(1− αφ)) ln(1 + γµt) +By. (B.2)
116
When v(µt−1) < 1, the decision belongs to the young. The ideal migration rate of
the young is found by maximizing equation (B.2) with respect to µt, holding other
things constant. This ideal point is given by
µ∗ =
β(1− α)(1 +m)− (1 + n)γ [(1 + β)α + β(1− α)(1− αφ)]
γα(1 + β[1− (1− α)φ]) ,
provided that 0 6 µ∗ 6 1. Non-negativity constraint requires that γ < γ where
γ = β(1−α)(1+m)
(1+n)(1+β[1−(1−α)φ]) . I will not ponder over the constraint µ
∗ 6 1, since it makes
less sense for the young to have ideal migration rate higher or equal to that of the
old who simply receives all benefits and incurs no cost. Before proceeding, I note
that, regardless of the choice of migration today, the young always prefer next
period’s choice of migration quota to be one, that is µt+1 = 1 (since they will be
the old generation of that period). Furthermore, to ensure himself as the decisive
voter in the next period, the young must consider the migration rate such that
1+µt
1+n+µt(1+m)
> 1, which means that µt 6 − nm .
Now suppose that µ∗ < − n
m
, I now have to show that it is best for the young to
just follow their ideal policy choice. Under this scenario, by choosing µ∗, the young
guarantees himself the position as the decisive voter in the next period as well as
maximizing his current utility. Therefore, this is the most preferable scenario for
the young, and he will get to choose his ideal policy positions in both periods of
his life.
The case where µ∗ > − n
m
is more complex. I must show that the young is
willing to restrict some migration in order to place himself the decisive voter in the
next period, when the incentive is right. Algebraically, this boils down to showing
that
−B ln(1 + γµ∗) + β(1− α) [ln(1 + n+ µ∗(1 +m)) + ln(1 + γµ∗)]
< −B ln(1− γ n
m
) + β(1− α)
[
ln(1 + n− n
m
(1 +m)) + ln(1 + γ)
]
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where B = (1 + β)α+ β(1− α)(1− αφ) and I have substituted in all the relevant











1 + n− n
m
(1 +m)

















)β(1−α)(1 + n− n
m
(1 +m)
1 + n+ µ(1 +m)
)β(1−α)
,
then I simply want the case where Ψ(µ∗) > 1. Is this the case? Not necessarily.
Notice that by the string of inequalities 0 < − n
m
< µ∗ < 1, the first two quantities
of Ψ(µ∗) are always greater than unity. So the question is whether the last quantity,
the ratio of the population gross growth rates (which is less than one), is small
enough to offset the other two. Under one setting this would not happen. When
− n
m
and µ∗ are close together (especially more relative to µ∗ and 1), the current
ideal point and the strategic point are not too far apart, so it is worth the sacrifice
to give up the ideal µ∗ in order to maintain decisive decision next period.
Consider now the case where γ > γ, the ideal migration rate for the young now
is zero, because the cost of having more immigrants outweighs the benefits that
the young could reap (recall that I restrict the migration rate to be nonnegative, so
there’s no deportation). In this case, the young will be maximizing his payoffs in
both period, since he again will be the majority next period (by default 0 < − n
m
).
This completes the proof.
For convenience of reference, I briefly summarize the necessary parameter values
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and function used in writing the proposition below
µ∗ =
β(1− α)(1 +m)− (1 + n)γ [(1 + β)α + β(1− α)(1− αφ)]
(1 +m)γα(1 + β[1− (1− α)φ]) (B.3)
γ =
β(1− α)(1 +m)










1 + n− n
m
(1 +m)
1 + n+ µ(1 +m)
)]β(1−α)
.(B.5)
Proof. (Lemma 14) I define formally the level µ∗ as (removing the time subscripts
on immigrant’s population growth rate because they are independent over time),
µ∗ =
β(1− α)(1 + Em)− (1 + n)γ [(1 + β)α + β(1− α)(1− αφ)]
(1 + Em)γα(1 + β[1− (1− α)φ]) ,
which should be compared with equation (B.3) to see that they are similar. Define
the function
g(m,µ) ≡ (1 + γµ)(1 +m)
1 + n+ µ(1 +m)
.
Then I know that
E {g(m, µ̂)} = g(Em,µ∗)
because these two quantities equate to the same constant (see the first order con-
dition). It can be shown that holding µ constant, ∂
2g(m,µ)
∂m2
6 0. So it must follows
that
g(Em, µ̂) > E {g(m, µ̂)}
= g(Em,µ∗)
by Jensen’s inequality. Since I assume that n < Em, it follows that γ < 1+Em
1+n
,
which implies that ∂g(m,µ)
∂µ
< 0. With the above inequality, I can conclude that
µ∗ > µ̂.
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Proof. (Proposition 15) Conditional on the belief parameter ζ, I must show that
it is optimal for the young to choose such a strategy. Note that, for if ζ 6 µ̂, then
for every immigration level that the young could choose to be strategic (i.e. within
the set [0, ζ]), the young will be better off choosing ζ since it’s the closest to his
bliss point. And if ζ > µ̂, then the young will lead a happy life. He can choose
his ideal policy µ̂, while believing that their cohort will continue to dominate the
political arena in the next period. So I only need to focus on the question whether
or not the young representative voter will want to act strategically. They will act
strategically if
0 < [β + α [1− (1− α)βφ]] ln(1 + γµ̂
1 + γζ
) + β(1− α)Et−1
{
ln(
1 + n+ ζ(1 +m)
1 + n+ µ̂(1 +m))
)
}
+β(1− α) ln( 1 + γ
1 + γµ̂
).
I use the fact that immigration in the next period will either be µ̂ or 1. I do not
need to consider the case where the next period’s young decisive voter will act
strategically, because if it is best for this period’s young to be non-strategic, it
will also be optimal for the next period’s young to choose similarly (by stationary
Markov-perfect property). So I can define the function






1 + n+ ζ(1 +m)
1 + n+ µ(1 +m))
)
}
+ β(1− α) ln( 1 + γ
1 + γµ
).
And the condition can be summarized as follows: the young decisive voter will





negative level of labor migration in impermissible, so even if µ̂ < ζ, the young
decisive voter can only choose as low as zero, which may be larger than µ̂.
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